Posts tagged ‘General Zia-ul-Haq’

January 9, 2012

What do Shia Muslims think about Imran Khan? – by Laibaah

by admin

A Shia Muslim scholar Allama Jawad Naqvi exposes the Saudi-ISI plan to revive a repackaged version of General Zia-ul-Haq Group (Religio-political fascists) in Pakistan

In this post, we present a thought provoking analysis by a Shia scholar on the re-emergence of Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) with the help of Pakistan army (ISI in particular) and its Jihadi-sectarian affiliates (e.g., Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (aka Lashkar-e-Jhangvi), Jamaat-ud-Dawa (aka Lashkar-e-Taiba), Jamaat-e-Islami etc. Given that the speaker in this video (Allama Jawad Naqvi) offers an analysis based on his particular ideological and political point of view, we do not necessarily agree with all of his arguments, however, given

October 19, 2011

Did someone say “Dr General-CMLA Ziaul Haq” too? — by Abbas Zaidi

by admin

When General Zia was awarded an LLD, there were no dissenting voices other than those of a few Punjab University professors. Most of them were sacked, and many of them were removed from department chairmanship

Ninety-nine percent of Pakistani (electronic and print) media (Urdu as well as English) is right wing, and 100 percent of it has run amok in fury over an honorary doctorate awarded to Interior Minister Rehman Malik by Governor Sindh Ishratul Ebad Khan. A newspaper editorialised its anger thus: “The huge smile on ‘Dr’ Malik’s face as he accepted his degree reaffirms his own sense of surety that all that he is doing is right.” A columnist wrote in

December 27, 2010

Shaheed Benazir Bhutto: The Soul of PPP – by Aamir Hussaini

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After the Judicial murder of ZAB, it was BB who was the life force for the young idealist activists of PPP. For these activists, often referred to as jiyalas, ZAB was a myth while BB was the current life force of the party. For the next 30 years after ZAB, it was BB who defined and lead the PPP.

Her journey starts under arrest by the Zia regime. The latter did his best to malign the young workers of the PPP who lead the MRD movement under the leadership of BB and Nusrat Bhutto. Towards this end, Zia used the political immaturity of the late Murtaza Bhutto and enlisted the help of ex-IJT activist, Salimullah Tipu in the staged hijacking of Peshawar-bound PIA plane from Karachi. The aim of this tyrant was to portray all jiyalas as terrorist and therefore de-legitimize the MRD movement and he used IJT activists like Tipu to penetrate the PSF.

Only Benazir stood in his way and exposed the dirty tactics of Zia and his coterie by ensuring that the MRD remained about democracy, federation and the aspirations of the masses. It was her genius to de-link the PPP/PSF and MRD from the staged hijacking master minded by Zia and it was this genious that allowed the party of young idealists to thrive.

After the MRD, Zia knew that the only way he could continue to take a hostage nation along his dark and bigoted path was to unleash the forces of fanaticism and fascism. He did the former by promoting sectarian elements starting from Jhang, Punjab. In Sindh, he cobbled together the MQM from prominent ex-IJT activists like Altaf Hussain and Farooq Satter.

Benazir is often accused of compromising on the ideology of the PPP; that much of this criticism comes from discredited traitor uncles who betrayed her father to the gallows speaks volumes. However, Benazir was a creative follower of her father and knew when to differentiate between relative and essential parts of Bhuttoism.

She proved herself on the Afghan issue where we can laud her creativity and foresight. The Afghan policy that she wanted was to respect the formation of an elected government and to end foreign interference in the affairs of Afghanistan. Even then, she could see the destructive effects of the Saudi Jihadism and wanted to save the youth from it. Benazir supported the UN peace initiatives in Afghanistan and in that regard; she ensured that the PPP would differentiate itself from the policies of the establishment.

Rare individuals have the ability to feel the pulse of emerging movements. Unlike many others on the Left, Benazir knew that the end of the Cold War would change the world radically. It was this ability that distinguished her from the rest of the civil society elites and other extensions of the Deep State. Similarly, it also distinguished her from compromised leftists like Tariq Ali whose support for the Taliban, Hamas and Hizbullah highlight that his thinking is still stuck in the Cold War while his purse is fed by the successors of Khomeini. Her education, travel and above all, her uncompromised intellect allowed her to see that the end of the Cold War dictated that a fresh political and economic approach was required. Liberal democracy, regional trade agreements and soft borders were the main features of this changed world and Benazir knew that Pakistan had to accept and adopt these new realities. When Benazir expressed that Pakistan needed a new political and economic vision, she was victimized by the PPP deserters and constrained by the perennial establishment after the 1988 elections.

The Presidency, Ministry of Finance and Foreign policy were off limits to her. Her efforts to initiate a lasting and transparent peace with India raised howls of protest from the Deep State; in their eyes this made her a traitor!

Nonetheless, Benazir realized that for Pakistan to emerge as a progressive, modern, enlightened and developed country, it had to be gently extricated from the clutches of the Deep State. Throughout her life, she actively and passively resisted the “Jihadi” adventurism of the security establishment, for whom this policy was a holy doctrine that the “bloody civilians” dare not change!

However, for Benazir, the end of the Cold War signaled the end of the “Crush India”, “Thousand Years War” and “Islamic Bloc” way of thinking. For her, it was about trade policies that would benefit the masses and not just the chattering elites. This was her vision when she presented the concept of Common Wealth of South Asian countries. Today, events have vindicated her progressive vision for which she was often derided as Pro West and Anti-Pakistan.

In espousing her progressive cause, she engaged in a decades-long struggle to campaign for the rights of women and minorities and provided tickets to minority members. Inspite of all the constraints placed on her by the establishment, she did her best to promote liberal change within the society and guide the electorate towards moderation and away from religious bigotry and fanaticism. She promoted the liberal and progressive sections within her party and did away with intransigent policies that alienated potential allies.

While the rest of Pakistan’s urban chattering elites are somnolent and awash in conspiracy theories, Benazir could see that 9/11 highlighted the growing cancer of extremism within the Muslims. Those who eulogize Hitler, Mawdodi and Khomeini can never be for peace and progress and Benazir did her best to promote a social justice agenda and guide people away from religious bigotry. In that regard, one can only appreciate the slogan:

“Bhutto-ism is our Destination and Benazir is our Leader”

Time has proved her right!

December 22, 2010

Updated: An open letter to the PPP – by Shams Rehman

by admin

With the dropping out of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) from the ruling coalition, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) government suddenly looks vulnerable. And the fact is that it has become vulnerable. The possibility of the revival of the defunct Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) has already been raised.

The historical parallels are very chilling. Those who witnessed the clerical movement in the late 70s against Z A Bhutto’s elected government have reasons to be fearful of the developing scenario. What is, therefore, imperative is to derive the correct lessons from history so that we do not repeat it, for the very thought of it sends shivers down one’s spine.

The first thing that the PPP needs to do is shun its obstinacy and habit of placing the responsibility of Bhutto’s fall and subsequent long persecutions of party workers on the unconstitutional actions of certain individuals or on adverse circumstances. A clear assessment should be made of the achievements and failures of the founder of the PPP, keeping in mind that the latter by no means diminish the former. All great leaders do make mistakes but the tendency to overlook them by their followers often leads to the eclipse of what they had achieved.

To put it briefly, the chief mistake that Bhutto made was the appeasement of the clerics. Why did he do this? This is a complex question but it was chiefly his foreign policy vision that determined the change in the course on which he had won the mandate to rule. His coming to power was a revolution, for he mobilised the masses and got himself elected on a socialist, progressive agenda that demanded radical socio-political changes in society. It included striking at the power of all the forces of reaction, of which the feudal lords, clerics and the army were the three interlinked wings. However, while in power, he gradually distanced himself and got alienated from the progressive agenda and the forces representing it.

The change of course was determined by his thinking that Pakistan would gain more by unifying the Islamic world around his leadership, tapping the resources of the Islamic world and creating a third bloc besides the ones led by the US and USSR. Such thinking marked a reversal on the home front that led to legislation such as the banning of alcohol and declaration of the Ahmedis as non-Muslims. This was a dangerous path that he chose for himself. What he failed to see was that in the Cold War era, the clerical forces were deeply allied with the US. Therefore, his strategy of standing up to the US while appeasing the clerics at home was bound to lead nowhere but to his own downfall.

Now political parties, by their intention and structure, are driven to political power. Parties are indeed formed, as the PPP was, on idealism, but once a party becomes part of the establishment, there is no room for idealism in its discourse or strategy. Thus Benazir made peace with the executioners of her father at home and abroad and made her party electable once again.

Since then the leadership of the party has come to believe that with its roots in all the provinces of the country it has secured its right to rule the country in a democratic set-up. But that is not the case. The religious right considers democracy that invests power to legislate to the people and their elected parliament as contrary to shariah and therefore un-Islamic. According to their vision of Islam, the ultimate authority in Islamic society rests with the ideologues and guardians of shariah, namely the clerics.

It is a brilliant fact of the history of this country that its people decisively rejected this view of Islam in 1970 in both parts of the country. Leading the Islamic world from the front, they demonstrated their understanding that the clerical view of Islam was only an ideology of the obscurantist forces, forming a nexus of clerics, feudal lords and the army, which seeks to maintain the outdated and unjust social and economic structure of society. Now, although this view continues to hold the Islamic world in thrall, the Pakistani people have never, in any free elections since 1970, voted for the religious parties. This is the core fact that we must remember in our review of the strategy being proposed.

The second core fact in this regard is the radical change in the geopolitical situation of the world. For now, after the fall of the USSR, a war has broken out between the former allies that brought the USSR down. The US, the remaining superpower, though increasingly on the wane, is at loggerheads with the global network of Islamic clerics. For the present PPP leadership, therefore, it would be a folly to follow Benazir’s policy of appeasing both the US and the clerics. Even from a purely pragmatic or realist perspective, which guided Benazir to revise direction, it is no more conducive to keep the party in power.

It is well worth pointing out that the west, led by the US, has all along betrayed its own ideals of enlightenment by supporting the forces of reaction in the non-western world. It has been content to create and support westernised elites in these countries that exercise control over their people by whatever means. The policy no doubt helped them in beating their international foe but the price was unimaginable even in their wildest dreams, for it is now widely feared that Afghanistan might also become the graveyard of the remaining superpower. For this reason, the US seems prepared, however unwillingly, to support the Pakistani government to take on the clerics and cut them down to size.

This remarkable development and change in the global situation provides the PPP leadership and workers with a historic opportunity to take that revolution further that their leader unleashed in 1970 and which was left unfinished. Now, with all quiet on the western front, it is this very realism, with the objective to remain in power, which demands that the PPP abandon its fear of the clerics and leading the people from the front, confront them and curb their power, hugely disproportional to their vote bank, that they continue to enjoy in our society. (Source)

Part II

In the current debate over the blatantly unjust Blasphemy Law and the persecution of a helpless Christian woman, the cat has once again come out of the bag. The clerics, who are hugely supported by the other two partners in the nexus, have made it clear that they do not accept the sovereignty of parliament and its right to legislate however it deems fit, or even the right of the constitutionally elected president to exercise his right to grant pardon to anyone condemned by any court of the country. Thus, once again, it is this simple question at the centre of the debate about whether the people govern this country through their elected representatives or the clerics by virtue of their self-professed divine right.

The PPP leadership and workers, therefore, need to wake up and read the situation correctly, which is hugely in their favour this time. It is perhaps an opportunity of the same magnitude that came the way of their leader in 1970 and which he lost as much due to his own failures as for the determinations of history. They must not lose it this time, for on its fulfillment hangs the fate of our future generations.

For President Zardari it would be a folly to believe that he can survive by giving in to the clerics; their appetite for power is insatiable. They know that they cannot win in a general election so they are bent upon using Islam to create a situation whereby their partners in the nexus can intervene in the name of national security and install a government that keeps them happy.

I understand that for President Zardari it would be difficult to make a U-turn and renounce the legacy of not only the latter-day Bhutto but also of his own spouse. But Zardari has a huge advantage at his disposal, for the US-cleric coalition that framed the unfortunate legacy is now broken. Our country has become a laughing stock for getting all our money from the outside world to fight the militant vanguard of the clerics while internally keeping their lifelines intact. It is indeed mind boggling that a government that openly claims to be an ally of the US in the so-called war on terror should leave the lifeline of its vocal internal enemies intact. Choosing the path of confronting them openly will surely enhance the stature of this country in the international community and will wash the stigma that this is a nation of hypocrites run by a hypocritical government.

Zardari has nothing to lose, for he has nothing substantial to his credit for which the Pakistani people can hold him in special reverence. Now he has the opportunity to make his name in history and grow even larger than his late spouse by becoming the second person to lead the people in their struggle to free themselves from the yoke of reactionary forces.

He must not consider, like Bhutto, that the seat he sits on secures him. He must come out of the Presidency, for if he thinks it is a castle, he must know that it is built on foundations of sand. He must go to the people and seek a fresh mandate on the simple question as to who possesses the right to govern this country: the people or the clerics and their allied network.

In a personal meeting recently I heard from a PPP MNA, a close associate of Zardari, that when party members come to him with long faces, frightened by the rising dangers to their power, he raises their spirits in no time and they leave happily, saying, “He is all right, he says all is well and there is nothing to fear as long as we stand united.” He enjoys the reputation of being a brave man among his party cadre. But Bhutto was no less a brave man; in the end, he said to his executioner: “Make it quick.”

The truth is that it is only the people of Pakistan who can save Zardari if he opts to come out to them. He must rally the enlightened intelligentsia of the country around him and prepare his party to fight the battle on two fronts. First, that it is the people of Pakistan and their elected representatives who have the sole right to govern their country and not the clerics, and second, that the view of Islam and shariah as propagated by the clerics is a tendentious, obscurantist view that conflicts with the teachings of the Quran and message of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).

On my part, I, a member of the academia in this country, can offer support on the second front. And I will conclude this brief letter with two questions. First, the clerics claim their authority higher than the people’s legislature in the name of the divine right of the ulema to guard Islam and the lives of its adherents. Is this right sanctioned in the Quran? The simple answer is no, it contradicts the teaching, even the words of the Quran, and, further, it has no sanction in the history of pre-modern Islamic civilisation. It is simply the other side of the conventional belief in the divinity of kings and the Quran supports neither the one nor the other, for both stand and fall together.

There is an important concept of asbab an-nazul (the reasons or causes behind the revelation of the verses of the Quran) employed in the exegesis of the Quran, which helps us understand the answer just given. Extending this concept, we must ask what the reasons of the descent of the Quran itself were and the institution of a separate religion other than Judaism and Christianity whose texts it affirmed again and again. One of the chief reasons was the institution of priesthood in both Judaism and Christianity that claimed a position between the believers and God and thereby claimed the right to control the whole mental and practical life of the believers. In the new dialectic between the individual and community that the Quran developed, each and every individual stood face to face with God while the right to legislate was invested in the community. It is clear then that the divine sanction of the clerical authority derives from Jewish and Christian influences and is therefore un-Islamic, for it is completely rejected by the Quran.

As for the second question, the clerics hold that the Quran is pre-eminently a book of law, or shariah, and since they hold all knowledge of it, they also hold the ultimate authority on how the people of this country should live their lives. Now there are 6,236 verses in the Quran of which only 290 deal with the law. What are the rest of the verses about? The truth is that they virtually do not exist for the clerics.(Source)

(Concluded)

The writer is an academic and teaches at the Quaid-i-Azam University

December 21, 2010

The Shia Question – by Imran Khan

by admin

Related article:

What can Pakistan and the entire world learn from Pakistani Shias?

Cross-posed from I Opyne

The term “Jewish Question” has been used in a variety of ways, but its most common usage has been an anti Semitic one; where it refers to all the “problems” that have been created because of the mere existence of the Jews. It was the Nazis who proposed a “final solution” to this question, a solution that they carried out in the death camps of Nazi Germany.

If you are a Sunni in Pakistan, it is very often that you might hear of “problems” such as; the Shia domination of decision making in our country, as well as their “perversion” of Islam. The spectrum of reactions to our very own “Shia Question” perhaps varies as much in Pakistan as the reaction to the Jewish Question used to vary in Europe. There are those who are just uncomfortable with the importance of Shias in our society while there are others who suggest solutions that are no different from those of the Nazis.

The 9th and 10th of Moharram this year passed by relatively peacefully, apart from one grenade attack in Peshawar,  the main processions dispersed safely through out the country. But the run up to the final days was marked by violence as well as the spoiling of some major terrorist plans. On December 11th, 15 people were killed when a truck bomb hit an Imam Bargah in Hangu, while terrorist plans were spoiled in KarachiDI Khanand Quetta, that could have resulted in similar carnages as past years.

Shias in Pakistan account for around 15 to 20% of our Muslim Population, and constitute the second largest concentration of Shias in the world, Iran being the largest. According to one source our Shia minority is estimated at 30 million and surpasses the number of Shias in Iraq.  If one is to look at the history of Pakistan; our most iconic leaders have belonged to the Shia community. The Founding Father of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah was a Shia and so is our most popular political dynasty, i.e. the Bhuttos. It is safe to say that the Shia beliefs of these icons of Pakistan’s political history never mattered to their overwhelmingly Sunni following.

However, things began to change during the 80s, resulting in a horrific increase in sectarian violence. According to thedatabase at South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP); in 1989, 18 people were killed in sectarian violence, during 1999 that figure rose to 86, while this year we lost a staggering, 496 people.  A report by the International Crisis Group that came out in 2005, states that around 70% of those killed in sectarian violence since 1985, belonged to the Shia community, the report further noted that presently Shia militancy in Pakistan is mostly a reaction to Deobandi militancy.

So what happened? How did a Sunni Majority Pakistan that flocked to the cause of a Shia Quaid-I-Azam and a Shia Quaid-I-Awam fall into this hopeless spiral of senseless killings? The answer lies in the Afghan Jihad, and the form our decision makers chose to sponsor it in. The rigid Wahabi interpretation of Islam, that was the driving force behind the morale of the Mujahideen, also had a very serious anti-Shia bent to it. The fatwas declaring Shias as Kafir came out during the heydays of the Afghan Jihad, the cannon fodder that was prepared for the war in Afghanistan came back to seek new infidels and found them in the form of Shias. Saudi support for the propagation of this hate was crucial, as Pakistan became the battleground for the cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The recent increase in attacks on Shias is a reflection of the growing strength of the Taliban. Thinking purely in terms of Pakistan’s national and strategic interests; if the “good” Taliban are those who simply concentrate on Americans and Afghans, and pose no harm to Pakistanis, then according to this definition, there are no good Taliban, as they all consider these 30 million Shia Pakistanis as wajib-ul-qatal, i.e. dead men walking. Our Taliban apologists in the media as well as politics, who bend over their backs in explaining the Taliban position as that of reactionary freedom fighters, completely ignore the Taliban hatred of the Shias, which is an essential part of the Taliban belief system and is not a reaction to any invasions.  Call them good or bad, a stronger Taliban would simply translate into even more violence against the Shias of Pakistan.

In the wake of attacks on Moharram processions many have expressed disdain about the need for carrying out these processions in the first place. It is believed that these processions are attacked because they offer themselves up for attacks. Well, the same logic could be applied to Juma congregations, just like Sunnis would still go to the mosque despite 180 deaths due to attacks on mosques this year, the same way the Shia would take part in Moharram processions, faith being the motivating factor in both situations.

But, the solution to this problem does not lie in curtailing religious freedoms; it lies in having an unbiased approach to this issue. The rising popularity of the Shia hating Taliban in a Sunni majority Pakistan, is a clear indication of how our biases are making us look the other way.

Appeared in Pakistan Today on the 21st of December 2010.

December 20, 2010

Can the Left become relevant to Islamic Pakistan? – by Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy

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The left has always been a marginal actor on Pakistan’s national scene. While this bald truth must be told, in no way do I wish to belittle the enormous sacrifices made by numerous progressive individuals, as well as small groups. They unionized industrial and railway workers, helped peasants organize against powerful landlords, inspired Pakistan’s minority provinces to demand their rights, set standards of writing and journalism, etc. But the Left has never had a national presence and, even at its peak during the 1970s, could not muster even a fraction of the street power of the Islamic or mainstream parties.

A comparison with India is telling. While the Indian Left has also never attained state power — or even come close to exercising power and influence on the scale of the Congress Party — it looms large in states like Kerala, Tripura, and West Bengal where it successfully ended iniquitous feudal land relations. Across the country it helps maintain a secular polity, protects minorities, keeps alive a broad focus on progressive ideas in culture, art, and education, and uses science to fight superstition. Today, a Maoist movement militantly challenges the depredations of capitalism as it wreaks destruction on their native habitat. Left-inspired movements noticeably impeded passage of the U.S.-India nuclear deal. Indeed, for all its divisions and in-fighting, the Indian Left is a significant political force that is a thousand times stronger than its Pakistani counterpart.

Surely this difference begs an explanation. The answer is to be found in Pakistan’s genesis and the overwhelming role of religion in matters of the state. Understanding this point in detail is crucial to the question: how can one hope to make the Pakistani Left relevant in the future? Are there intelligent ways to deal with a major handicap?

Pakistan’s Early Years

Carved out of Hindu-majority India, Pakistan was the culmination of the competition and conflict between natives who had converted to Islam and those who had not. On the whole, Indian Muslims had less education and were less willing than Hindus to accept alien ways of thinking, including communist and socialist ideas. They opposed the British for obvious nationalistic reasons, but they also saw science and modernity as alien impositions. In 1835, for example, more than 8,000 Muslim notables in the state of Bengal signed a petition against the teaching of English and modern ideas.

Realizing the conservatism of his constituency, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, later to become the founder of Pakistan, demanded a separate country for Muslims based upon his 1940 articulation of the Two-Nation Theory. This stated that Hindus and Muslims could never live together peacefully within one nation state. An impeccably dressed Westernized man with Victorian manners, secular outlook, and a taste for fine foods and wines, Jinnah nevertheless eloquently articulated the fears and aspirations of an influential section of his co-religionists. The Communist Party of India thought poorly of him, but, seeing that enormous communal forces had been unleashed, many of its Muslim members eventually chose to support the demand for a separate Pakistan. After Partition they went on to form the nucleus of Pakistan’s Left, which bravely struggles on despite the odds.

Interestingly, Jinnah was also opposed by a section of the conservative Muslim ulema, such as Maulana Maudoodi of the Jamaat-e-Islami. They argued that Islam was a universal religion not to be confined within national borders. But Jinnah and his Muslim League, by enlisting the influential Muslim feudal and bourgeois class, won the day by insisting that Muslims constituted a distinct nation which would be overwhelmed in post-British India by a larger, wealthier, and better-educated Hindu majority.

Pakistan’s basis in religious identity soon led to painful paradoxes. An overbearing West Pakistan ran roughshod over East Pakistan and was despised as an external imperial power. Jinnah’s Two-Nation theory was left in tatters after the separation of East Pakistan in 1971, and the defeat of the Pakistani military. The enthusiasm of Muslim Bengalis for Bangladesh — and their failure to repent decades after the separation — was a blow against the very basis of Pakistan. Nevertheless, contrary to dire predictions, the Pakistani state survived. Its powerful military crushed emerging separatist movements in the provinces of Baluchistan and Sind.

For a while after 1971 the question of national ideology fell into limbo. Aware of the popular demand for economic justice, the newly-elected prime minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, also knew that anything that smacked of Marx’s “religion is the opiate of the masses” could not work. The shrewdest politician that Pakistan has ever had, he invented “Islamic socialism” and inspired an agenda for progressive change. But land reform for him, as a big landlord, would have meant too much personal sacrifice. For all his electioneering rhetoric, he also did not wish to alienate the other pillars of the Pakistani state: the army and industrial class. Social reform took back-stage. Instead Bhutto chose to raise national fervor by promising revenge for the loss of the East Wing, declared a “war of a thousand years” against India, and started off Pakistan’s quest for the atomic bomb. Although anti-Indianism served temporarily as a rallying cry, the military coup of 1977 that sent Bhutto off to the gallows was to revive the national identity issue.

Zia Remakes Pakistan

Soon after he seized powerR, General Zia-ul-Haq announced his intention to remake Pakistan and end the confusion of Pakistan’s purpose and identity once and for all. The word soon went out that Pakistan was henceforth not to be described as a Muslim state. Instead, it was now an Islamic state where Islamic law would soon reign supreme. To achieve this re-conceptualization, Zia knew that future generations of Pakistanis would have to be purged of liberal and secular values.

Thus began a massive decade-long state-sponsored project. Democracy was demonized and declared un-Islamic, culture was purified of Hindu contamination, Hindi words were removed from Urdu to the extent possible, capital punishment was freely used, left and liberal opinion was silenced, and religion was introduced into every aspect of public and private life. Education became a key weapon.

Zia’s generation is everywhere today in Pakistan. A moderate Muslim majority country has become one where the majority of citizens want Islam to play a key role in politics. The effects of indoctrination are clearly visible. Even as the sharia-seeking Taliban were busy blowing up girls’ schools (457 to date), a survey by World Public Opinion.Org in 2008 found that 54 percent of Pakistanis wanted strict application of sharia while 25 percent wanted it in some more dilute form. Totaling 79 percent, this was the largest percentage in the four countries surveyed (Morocco, Egypt, Pakistan, Indonesia).

A more recent survey of 2,000 young Pakistanis between 18-27 years of age found that “three-quarters of all young people identify themselves primarily as Muslims. Just 14 percent chose to define themselves primarily as a citizen of Pakistan.” The youth are deeply worried by lack of employment, economic inflation, corruption, and violence. In this turbulent sea, it is not surprising that most see religion as their anchor.

For some, violent change is the answer to the country’s problems. This is precisely what Zaid Hamid, Pakistan’s self-styled Hitler-clone, advocates. A fiery demagogue who claims to have fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan, he builds on the insecurity of the young. Enthralled college students pack auditoriums to listen to this self-proclaimed jihadist rail against Jews, Hindus, and Christians. Millions watch him on various TV channels as he lashes out against Pakistan’s corrupt rulers and other “traitors,” praises the Afghan Taliban as heroes and a force of resistance, and promises that those who betrayed the nation’s honor by joining America’s war on terror will hang from lampposts in Islamabad. In his promised Islamic utopia of amputations and stonings, speedy Taliban-style justice will replace the clumsy and corrupt courts established by the imperial British.

Just as Hitler dwelt on Germany’s “wounded honor” in his famous beer hall oratory in Munich — where he promised that Germany would conquer the world — Hamid calls for the Pakistan Army to rebel against its American masters and go to war against India, liberate Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya and Afghanistan. Pakistan’s flag shall inshallah soon fly from Delhi’s Red Fort, he announces. The students applaud wildly.

Hating America

Pakistan is probably the most anti-American country in the world. Right, center, and left share the antipathy. Surveys show that the United States is disliked far less in Cuba, Iraq, and Afghanistan — all countries that have been attacked by Washington. A private survey carried out by a European embassy based in Islamabad found that only 4 percent of Pakistanis polled speak well of America, 96 percent against. The United States has displaced India as Pakistan’s number one enemy, at least for now.

Why these intense feelings? Drone strikes are often quoted, but these are relatively precise strikes on Al-Qaida and Taliban targets in Waziristan, which have devastated the Islamist leadership while killing some civilians as well. Although the death of innocents is terrible and deserves condemnation, it is utterly insignificant compared to the carnage in Vietnam’s cities which were carpet-bombed by B-52’s in the 1970s. Nevertheless, the anger in Pakistan leads to a ferocious anger far greater than ever existed in Vietnam.

The explanation may lie in wounded pride and Pakistan’s dependence syndrome. U.S.-Pakistan relations are frankly transactional — America today pays Pakistan to fight a war that is primarily for America’s benefit. It is a separate matter that Pakistan must now fight the war for its own survival. Some Pakistanis use the crude image of a condom to describe the U.S.-Pakistan relationship; Pakistan will be used for the business at hand and be cast off immediately when the business is concluded. This self-loathing is typical of what a client state develops for its paymaster. One sees this in Egypt as well.

Pakistan’s excessive dependence on external powers comes from its long-standing dispute with India over Kashmir. This called for much military hardware, soon acquired by turning towards the West. In the 1950s, Pakistan entered into the SEATO and CENTO military pacts aimed against communism. This made the Pakistani Army the most powerful and well organized institution in the country. In time it developed huge corporate interests and has, directly or indirectly, run Pakistan since the first military coup in 1958.

Pakistan has a litany of other grievances as well. An early one is that the United States. did not aid Pakistan in its 1965 and 1971 wars against India where, according to Pakistan’s understanding, it was required to do so. Other grievances are pan-Islamic while yet others derive from Pakistan’s bitter experience of being a U.S. ally in the 1980s. Then at the cutting edge of the U.S.-organized jihad against the Soviets, Pakistan was dumped once the war was over and left alone to deal with numerous toxic consequences. Among them was a large army of ideologically-charged fighters, willing to put their finely-honed skills to use. But disadvantage was soon turned to advantage when the Pakistani state hit upon using these fighters for bleeding India in Kashmir, as well as securing strategic depth in Afghanistan. The dragon seed, planted by the Pakistan Army, is only half regretted today.

The Conspiracy Industry

In a country that can boast of few achievements in improving the lot of its own people, legitimate criticisms tend to be conflated with illegitimate ones. After all, it is human nature to blame others for one’s own miseries. Today the United States is frequently held to blame for Pakistan’s ills, old and new. Absurdities abound. Surely America should not be held responsible for the sewage-contaminated water that Pakistanis must drink, the pitifully low level of taxes collected, the barbarity of the police, or the massive theft of electricity by rich and poor alike. Nor can it be blamed for the fact that Kashmir is unresolved and that Pakistan’s generals foolishly thought of winning it through covert war.

Of course, Pakistan is not the only country where America provides a rationalization for internal failures. U.S.-bashing is a structural phenomenon where, at least sometimes, it has nothing to do with what America actually does. For example, one recently saw the amazing spectacle of Hamid Karzai threatening to join the Taliban and lashing out against the Americans because they (probably correctly) suggested he had committed electoral fraud.

In the present anti-American climate, the manufacture of conspiracy theories has become Pakistanis’ single biggest industry. Various polls show that the events of 9/11 are assumed by most Pakistanis to have been a CIA-Mossad conspiracy designed to malign Muslims and a part of the West’s war on Islam. It is also believed that Osama bin Laden did not carry out these attacks and, even if he did, that he died long ago. Many think he is an American agent trained and armed by the CIA, while Blackwater is believed to be behind suicide attacks in Pakistani markets and mosques. On the other hand, the Afghan Taliban are often pictured as simply freedom-loving people trying to free their country from foreign occupation. Just when one feels that the limits of absurdity have finally been crossed, some popular television anchor throws out a conspiracy story that leaves one gasping.

Example: for months one heard the theory from various popular anchorpersons that leaders of the Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud, were U.S. agents. But there was deafening silence when these leaders were killed by American drones. And, by the way, what happened to the khatna (circumcision) theory — that suicide bombers were uncircumcised and were either Blackwater employees or Indian agents? Now that one can check the carcasses of suicide bombers frozen in cold storage, that theory has conveniently disappeared from the market.

Pakistan’s collective psychosis is painful to behold. When a suicide bomber walked into the female cafeteria at the Islamic University in Islamabad, followed by a second bomber in the male cafeteria, one might have thought that great anger would have been expressed at the Taliban. Instead, the brainwashed students vented their anger at the university administration, government, and America instead of the perpetrators of this heinous deed. The Jamaat-e-Islami and other religious political parties flatly refused to condemn the suicide attack on students.

Ordinary Pakistanis — including the bearded and burqa’ed ones — have fully bought into America-bashing. So does the Westernized elite which yearns for a Green Card, sends its children to U.S. universities, listens to American pop music, and drives out in fancy cars to a McDonald’s. It also includes Pakistanis permanently settled in the United States, who writhe in guilt knowing they live off an anti-Muslim superpower — as they see it.

Tragically for Pakistan, anti-Americanism has played squarely into the hands of Islamic militants. They vigorously promote the notion that this is a bipolar conflict of Islam versus imperialism when, in fact, they are actually waging an armed struggle to remake society. They will keep fighting this war even if America were to miraculously evaporate into space. Created by poverty, a war-culture, and the macabre manipulations of Pakistan’s intelligence services, religious militants want a total transformation of society. This means eliminating music, art, entertainment, and all manifestations of modernity and Westernism. Side goals include chasing away the few surviving native Christians, Sikhs, and Hindus from the Frontier province.

There is certainly legitimate reason for countries across the world to feel negatively about America. In pursuit of its self-interest, wealth and security, it has waged illegal wars, bribed, bullied and overthrown governments, supported tyrants and military governments, and undermined movements for progressive change. But nutcase conspiracy-thinking of “foreign hands” being behind most ills is deadly for a nation’s mental health. If some “foreign hand” is imagined behind everything, then that kills self-confidence and one’s ability to control outcomes. Imagining these “extra-terrestrial” forces deadens the ability to think rationally and sharply reduces the capacity to deal with terrorism — which is here to stay in Pakistan for the foreseeable future.

Pakistanis, who desperately want someone to stand up to the Americans, have bought into the notion of the Taliban as being somehow anti-imperialist. Today, in a country that is divided on everything else, strong anti-U.S. feelings provide a rare point of consensus. Sadly, some in the Pakistani Left seek to cash in on this.

Is The Left’s Negativism Helpful?

Go to a left-wing rally and the standard chants are: down with religious extremism, down with the Army, down with American imperialism, down with the drones. This position of “downing” everyone and everything is laudably pure and pious. But it scarcely helps us answer the question: who shall protect Pakistan’s population from religious militants, stop the daily dynamiting of girls’ schools and colleges, prevent human bombers from exploding themselves in mosques and markets, and end the slaughter of Shiites?

The notion that protection can come from “mobilizing the working class” is laughable. The demonstrations in Pakistan against the U.S. invasion of Iraq were miniscule compared to those in Europe and America. It is irresponsible to think that somehow the fierce onslaught of an army of fascistic holy warriors can be stopped by two dozen earnest people holding colorful placards.

So what is to be done? Every option is a bad one: local militias (lashkars), the police and Frontier Constabulary, the Pakistan Army, and the American drones. The lashkars often have criminals within them and are certainly known to avenge old tribal scores; the police and FC are notorious for corruption and brutality; the Army originally fathered the Taliban and is still a dubious quantity; and the Americans cynically manipulated religious fanaticism when it suited them. But without some combination of these unsavory forces, there will be carnage of ordinary people.

Let us recall what happened in Swat. A weak-kneed state, earlier complicit with the Taliban, had allowed the fanatics to devastate this idyllic tourist-friendly valley before it was brought to its senses and finally persuaded into using military force against the fanatics. Women had been lashed in public, hundreds of girls’ schools were blown up, non-Muslims had to pay a special tax (jizya), and every form of art and music was forbidden. Policemen deserted en masse, and institutions of the state crumbled. Thrilled by their success, the Taliban violated the Nizam-e-Adl Swat deal just days after it was negotiated in April 2009. They quickly moved to capture more territory in the adjacent area of Buner. Then barely 80 miles from Islamabad (as the crow flies), their spokesman, Muslim Khan, crowed that the capital would be captured soon.

Had the Pakistan Army not moved against the Swat Taliban, the consequences for the rest of the country would have been grim. Today the situation there is far from good, but it is immensely better than it was a year ago when headless corpses were strewn in public squares in Mingora and Saidu Sharif. The Army is popular there once again, a supreme irony because it was responsible for having let the Taliban establish themselves in Swat. It will never be decisively established whether Maulana Fazlullah, leader of the Swat Taliban, was put up by the Army. But it certainly did nothing to stop his fiery broadcasts until he finally turned against the Army.

Terrorism is here to stay in Pakistan, and the battle has only begun. And although there are no good guys, nothing can be worse than the Taliban. Through terror tactics and suicide bombings they have made fear ubiquitous. Women are being forced into the burqa, while anxious private employers and government departments have advised their male employees in Peshawar and other cities to wear shalwar-kameez rather than trousers. Coeducational schools across Pakistan are increasingly fearful of attacks — some are converting to girls-only or boys-only schools. Video shops are going out of business, while native musicians and dancers have fled or are changing their profession. A sterile Saudi-style Wahhabism is beginning to impact upon Pakistan’s once-vibrant culture and society.

The cancerous offshoots of extremist ideology continue to spread. Another TTP is important — Tehrik-e-Taliban Punjab. Indeed, one expects that major conflict will eventually shift from Pakistan’s tribal peripheries to the heartland, southern Punjab. The Punjabi Taliban are busy ramping up their operations, with repeated successful suicide attacks on the police and intelligence headquarters.

The future: dazed by the brutality of these attacks, the army’s officer corps finally appears to be moving away from its earlier sympathy and support for extremism. At least for now, tribal insurgents cannot overrun Islamabad and Pakistan’s main cities, which are protected by thousands of heavily armed military and paramilitary troops. In reaction, rogue elements within the military and intelligence agencies are instigating and organizing suicide attacks against their own colleagues.

Pakistan must find the will to fight the Taliban, and the Left must consider its duty to help in this fight. The national and provincial governments must protect life and law rather than simply make deals that fall apart no sooner than they are made. As an Islamic state, Pakistan is falling into anarchy and chaos, being rapidly destroyed from within by those who claim to fight for Islam.

Can The Left Become Relevant?

What can the left do to turn the situation around? The answer is: not very much. It is too small. Although its efforts for creating a better society will not and should not cease, it has no realistic chance of becoming a major national force in the foreseeable future. Instead, given the bankruptcy of Pakistan’s Islamic and mainstream parties, perhaps the Left’s real importance lies in being a moral force that helps nudge Pakistani society in a positive direction.

To do this, leftists must use simple direct arguments instead of convoluted explanations that conflate all adversaries together at the same time. Examples:

Take the brave struggle of peasants in Okara, rightly helped by numerous small left-wing groups, for preserving their land from a predatory military that seeks to displace them. This is a conflict between the tillers of the soil and those who seek to grab the wealth of others. In this case it is right, proper, and essential to challenge the Pakistan Army because it has illegitimate claims to the land. But why the slogans against imperialism, which neither knows nor cares about the Okarans? All that this does is muddy the waters.
Why even imagine that the Taliban want liberation? While religious extremists indeed derive some support from marginalized social groups, they do not demand employment, land reform, better health care, or more social services. There is nothing progressive in their agenda, and no place for social justice and economic development. There is silence about worldly things like roads, hospitals and infrastructure. The Taliban are not the Maoists of Pakistan, nor do they subscribe to some form of South American liberation theology. Instead, they see their reward lying in heaven. It is also false that the Taliban constitute an ethnic “Pakhtun movement,” as some prominent left-wingers argue. This serves only as an excuse for tolerating their barbarities. Most Taliban victims have been other Pakhtuns. If the Taliban is a Pakhtun movement then what about the Punjabi Taliban, who are as ethnically different from Pakhtuns as chalk from cheese? The Pakhtun and Punjabi Taliban share an ideological commitment — and that is precisely what Talibanism is all about.
The Baluch, Sindhis, Siraikis, Baltis, and many other ethnic groups have legitimate complaints against the arrogant center in Islamabad. They certainly deserve support from progressive people. But ethnic groups sometimes look through a very narrow, parochial lens that should not be condoned. After all, the vision of the Left is for a society where economic justice for all is the goal. A person’s ethnic origins, religion and nationality are mere products of circumstance. There is no need to glorify any one of these — at least from a left perspective.
Let me state the bald truth: Pakistan needs reform not revolution. The Left needs to know that there is not a chance in a million of capturing state power in the foreseeable future. In fact, the only ones who can even conceivably bring about a revolution are the Islamists. And their revolution is to be dreaded because they will wipe out every little gain made in sixty years. Therefore the Left must pick its fights, and not try to fight everyone at the same time.

At a time when the country needs clarity of thought, one must not look at everything through the prism of fossilized ideologies. Nor should one pose moralistic questions like: “Is America good or bad?” Of course America is just as selfish as most other countries, has repeatedly committed aggression overseas, has worsened the Palestine problem, and maintains the world’s largest military machine. We also know that it will rush to make a deal with the Taliban if that is perceived to be in its self-interest, and will do so even if that means abandoning the people of Afghanistan to blood-thirsty fanatics. But for Pakistanis the important question is: what are the options for Pakistan’s people today?

Instead of chasing demons, Pakistan’s leftists need to reaffirm their allegiance to what truly matters: the ideals of economic justice, secularism, universalistic ideas of human rights, good governance, women’s rights, and rationality in human affairs. Washington must be firmly resisted, but only when it seeks to drag Pakistan away from these goals. It is futile to frame the debate in pro- or anti-America terms; the key point is to be pro-people. The Left has a hugely important role to play in setting the moral compass. Only then will it matter to Pakistan.

Source: New Politics

December 19, 2010

Pakistan's powerful religious right: How Islam has shaped modern Pakistan – by Urmila Venugopalan

by admin

It’s Unfortunate that native Sufi Islam in Pakistan has become threatened by Wahabi Islam(Saudi Arabia’s official Islamic ideology), especially in many areas of the northwestern area and southern Punjab. The mordancy, of course, is that Wahabism was imported into Pakistan by the state and nurtured through radical education.

The Article below depicts an interesting case study in the history of radicalization in Pakistan. There is a gradual replacement of liberal, tolerant, and syncretic Sufi Islam with conservative, intolerant, and fascist Wahabi Islam in Pakistan over the past 30 years.

Thanks to the long military rules and security-intelligence establishment’s ill-conceived policies of strategic depth and bleed India’ that also disturbed the traditional religious fabric of the land by challenging the prevalent Sufism in the area. Most Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan have embraced the puritanical and radical Wahabi brand of Islam. These new Wahabis with Saudi Arabia backing have not only waged a jihad against the western “infidels” but also against the believers of Sufi Islam.

Fodder for the Taliban

Pakistan’s powerful religious right – How Islam has shaped modern Pakistan -by Urmila Venugopalan

Islamist parties and organizations across Pakistan are warning of anarchy if the civilian government attempts to repeal the nation’s strict blasphemy law and pardon Asia Bibi, an illiterate farm worker who was sentenced to death last month. Following Bibi’s sentencing, on Dec. 12 a doctor in Pakistan’s Sindh province was arrested on suspicion of violating the same controversial law.

An understanding of the religious right’s rise, particularly its powerful role in the Islamization of the country and its laws and the group’s continuing significance, highlights one of the key challenges to Pakistan’s stability.

This is a puzzle that has played a major role in the US government’s failure to force or persuade the Pakistanis to eliminate the safe havens for the Taliban and al Qaeda across the border in Afghanistan, where America has been embroiled in a nine-year war that started after the Sept. 11, 2001 destruction of the World Trade Towers in New York and so far has cost nearly 1,500 NATO troops’ lives.

The influence of such parties is all the more striking given their lack of a popular support base comparable with the mainstream secular parties. Although Pakistan remains on the whole a largely conservative country, the most recent general elections, held in February 2008, produced a resounding defeat of the Islamist parties.

Nevertheless, the religious right has succeeded in blocking or diluting any attempt to reform discriminatory Islamic legislation, including the blasphemy law. This is because over the years, politically expedient alliances with the military have afforded Islamist parties a level of authority and influence that is disproportionate to their electoral clout.

The religious right and the army have come together at various times in Pakistan’s recent history. Under the rule of both Zia ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf, the military has allied with conservative religious groups with the shared objective of undermining the secular mainstream parties, namely the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N).

For example, during the 1980s, General Zia’s allies included the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and orthodox Sunni political parties such as the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) among others. Both the JI and JUI were the military’s main partners during the Afghan jihad, helping to recruit and indoctrinate foot soldiers for the anti-Soviet campaign. During this conflict, JI and JUI-operated madrassas in the northwest of Pakistan, near the Afghan border, became primary recruiting and training grounds for jihadi forces. The JI also became an important ally in domestic politics. Indeed, the general’s Islamization drive at home was aimed at legitimizing his rule, winning the support of JI and other religious parties, and marginalizing the PPP-led secular opposition. This resulted in a raft of amendments, which institutionalized discrimination against minority communities such as non-Muslims and Ahmadis, a marginal Sunni sect, and women.

Similarly, Musharraf’s desire to crush his main opposition, Benazir Bhutto’s PPP and Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N, prompted him to back and empower the Muttahida Masjlis-e-Amal (MMA). This six-party Islamist alliance was led by the JI and the JUI-F, Fazlur Rehman’s Deobandi (a puritanical Sunni sub-sect) faction of JUI. Rigged elections in 2002 saw the MMA gain control of the North-West Frontier Province and become the main coalition partner of Musharraf’s party in Balochistan. In NWFP, in particular, the MMA pursued extensive Islamization policies, while at the same time voting for Musharraf’s substantial constitutional amendments and his continuation as president. Musharraf’s courtship of the religious right for political ends allowed Islamist parties an unprecedented level of political influence, allowing it to derail several intended reforms.

Further, their association with jihadi groups continued to grow. In fact, according to the International Crisis Group, JI madrasas “have long maintained links with jihadi organizations” and Fazlur Rehman’s party “made no attempt [when it was in power] to hide its support for the Afghan Taliban with JUI-F madrasas recruiting and training Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns for the Taliban.”

In addition to military patronage, particular Islamist parties such as the JI have been able to sustain their influence because of their robust internal organization. For example, JI’s notorious student wing, the Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba – which has a strong presence in mainstream universities and high schools – as well as the group’s vast network of madrassas, provide the party with its significant street power. This is underpinned by strong relations between the party base and its leadership, a characteristic that is sorely lacking within the ranks of the PPP and PML-N.

The JI-led street demonstrations are, at the very least, extremely disruptive, especially in major urban centers such as Karachi, and have the ability to derail reform efforts. The secular parties, despite their strength at the ballot box, have been reluctant to roll back the blasphemy law and other discriminatory legislation for fear of a backlash from the religious right.

The threat to stability posed by the religious right is not, however, restricted to violent street protests. Indeed, a dangerous by-product of the blasphemy and anti-Ahmadi laws – which are based on orthodox Sunni interpretations of Islam – is that they have encouraged religious and sectarian extremism. According to the defense publication Jane’s, “these laws, and the general climate they create, provide fertile turf for radical sectarian groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Jundallah, Jaish-e-Mohammad and others.” Inter-sect violence in the form of attacks on Shias by radical Deobandis comprise the bulk of terrorist incidents in Pakistan, followed by intra-sect hostility in the form of targeted killings of Ahmadis and, to a lesser extent, Barelvis, a rival Sunni sub-sect.

Regardless of how Asia Bibi’s case plays out, unless the blasphemy and other such discriminatory laws are repealed, the religious right will continue exploit them to advance a narrow ideological agenda. Indeed, a holistic appreciation of Pakistan’s extremist threat is incomplete without understanding the impact of Islamist parties on the country’s complex religious landscape and polity.

Source: Asia Sentinel

December 13, 2010

Blasphemy cases: False accusers escape punishment

by admin

Related Article:

Shia physician charged with blasphemy in Hyderabad Sindh

The impact of blasphemy laws on human rights

LAHORE: A number of blasphemy cases continue to be registered against innocent people out of personal vendetta, yet routinely no action is taken against complainants whose accusations prove to be false after due investigations.

The incidence of implicating innocent people under blasphemy laws is much higher in Punjab than the rest of the country.

Astonishingly, 801 of the 1,031 people imprisoned under these laws are Muslim. Of the remaining 230 prisoners 162 are Christians, 15 are Sikh, 28 are Buddhists while 25 persons are adherents of other faiths.

Currently, a total of 130 people are facing blasphemy charges in various prisons across Punjab, including 122 Muslims and eight Christians.

Official data obtained by The Express Tribune shows that at least 232 people were freed from 32 jails in the province because of lack of evidence and as many as 554 people were out on bail because of an “out-of-court settlement” – a recourse unavailable to such accused. Of the total, cases against 339 were dropped, 13 died in jails of natural causes, one detainee committed suicide in jail, one was murdered in jail while two prisoners were murdered outside jails.

Only one under trial prisoner detained in district jail Lahore Under Section 295, 20 under-trial prisoners detained in six prisons in Punjab, including 12 prisoners only in Central Jail, Faisalabad, under Section 295-A, 40 under-trial prisoners detained in 17 jails across Punjab under Section 295-B while there are only 17 under-trail prisoners in eight jails.

As many as five prisoners have been convicted under Section 295-A, 22 convicted under Section 295-B, 26 under Section 295-C while only nine prisoners have been sentenced to death.

Blasphemy laws were introduced by General Ziaul Haq in 1986. Before these laws were introduced, only one person was booked Under Section 295 in 38 years between 1947 and 1985 in the district jail of Lahore.

Over the next 24 years, 1,030 people were booked under blasphemy laws.

Published in The Express Tribune, December 13th, 2010.

December 4, 2010

In Pakistan, Christianity Earns a Death Sentence -by Omar Waraich

by admin

Governor Salman Taseer’s wife Amina Taseer and daughter Shahar Bano listening Asia Bibi's sad story and expressing concern and sympathy to her.

It all began a year and a half ago, with a quarrel over a bowl of water. A group of women farm workers were suffering in the heat near a village in Pakistans Punjab province. Aasia Noreen, an illiterate 45-year-old mother five, offered them water, but was rebuffed. Noreen was a Christian, they said, and therefore her water was uncleansadly, a common taunt hurled at Pakistan’s beleaguered Christians. But rather than swallowing the indignity, she mounted a stout defense of her faith.
Word of the exchange swiftly filtered through the village of Ittan Wali, in Sheikhupura district. The local mullah took to his mosque’s loudspeakers, exhorting his followers to take action against Noreen. In a depressingly familiar pattern, her defense of her faith was twisted into an accusation of blasphemy, according to her family and legal observers familiar with the case. As a frenzied mob pursued her, the police intervened, taking her into custody. But far from protecting her, they arrested and charged Noreen with insulting Islam and its prophet. And on Nov. 8, after enduring 18 months in prison, she was sentenced to death by a district court, making her the first woman to suffer that fate.

In the ensuing weeks, the case of Noreen, popularly known as Aasia Bibi, has sparked a national furor. Human rights campaigners and lawyers have denounced the sentence. Religious fundamentalist groups, usually at odds with one another, have suddenly coalesced around a campaign to defend the blasphemy law and attack its critics. One politician who called for Noreen to be pardoned now faces a fatwa for alleged apostasy. Another politician, who is trying to have the blasphemy laws amended, has been warned that she will be besieged. On television, religious scholars have disagreed among themselves over the law’s merits. Divisions are also being seen within the government, with powerful figures taking opposing sides. And there has even been global outrage, with Pope Benedict XVI last week calling for Noreen’s freedom.
Noreen’s case has spurred the first genuine debate over some of Pakistans most controversial laws. The original blasphemy law was drawn up by the British, in the Indian Penal Code of 1860, aimed at keeping the peace among the subcontinent’s sometimes fractious diversity of faiths. Not only did Pakistan inherit the laws after partition, but it added to them. In the 1980s, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s military dictatorship introduced a slew of elastically worded clauses, including a death sentence for those deemed to have defiled the sacred name of the Prophet.

Before Zia, there were only two reported cases of blasphemy. Since the death sentence was inserted in 1986, the number has soared to 962 — including 340 members of the Ahmadi Muslim sect, 119 Christians, and 14 Hindus. Close examination of the cases reveals the laws often being invoked to settle personal vendettas, or used by Islamist extremists as cover to persecute religious minorities.

Vague wording allows the blasphemy laws to be used an instrument of political and social coercion, says Ali Dayan Hasan, senior South Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch. And they give the state a sectarian character.

No conclusive evidence has been presented against Noreen, say people familiar with the case. The district judge relied on the testimonies of three other women, all of whom bore animus toward her.

Noreen had long been under pressure by fellow farmworkers to convert to Islam, her family says. And the district judge ruled out any possibility of her innocence or mitigating circumstances.
Christians are subject to vicious prejudice in Pakistan, where there beliefs are said to make them “unclean.” Municipalities routinely advertise jobs for cleaners with a note saying they would prefer Christian applicants. And defending their rights is not popular.

When Salmaan Taseer, the governor of Punjab, visited Noreen in prison and urged her release, he was branded an apostate by fundamentalist groups. And in the fundamentalist view, apostasy, like blasphemy, is punishable by death.
Liberal lawmaker Sherry Rehman who has called for amendment of the blasphemy laws and removal of the death sentence clause was warned this week that she would be “besieged.” It is a measure of the state’s impotence in the face of extremist groups that such high-profile public figures can be openly threatened for merely advocating human rights, says Hasan, of Human Rights Watch.
Rehman insists that she won’t be cowed by the threats. “I really can’t be coerced into silencing myself like this,” she tells TIME. “It’s my freedom as a legislator to do as I do. If they want to talk, there’s no issue. But to use coercion is unacceptable.” Taseer, a notably outspoken politician, is phlegmatic. “It doesnt bother me,” he tells TIME. “Who the hell are these illiterare maulvis to decide to whether I’m a Muslim or not?”

Rehman’s reform effort is unlikely to succeed, because few politicians have dared to support it. Indeed, Babar Awan, the Law Minister has vowed to oppose any move against the blasphemy laws. What’s more, the Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, who had last year suggested the laws should be reviewed after the killing of nine Christians in Punjab, now seems to be distancing himself. “It is not our party policy,” he told a news channel this week, when asked about Rehman’s bill. But Rehman, who spent years fighting laws that discriminate against women, says its mere submission is an important first step: “The first stone has been cast. It’s not a taboo subject anymore to be taken up by legislators.”

More worrying is the fate of Noreen. The Lahore High Court has taken the controversial step of saying that it won’t allow President Asif Ali Zardari to issue a pardon, a move that legal experts have said is unconstitutional. Her family is now hoping that the higher courts will strike down the death sentence, or that she will eventually secure a pardon. And the fear doesn’t end there. While no one has been executed for blasphemy yet, 32 people — including two judges — have been slain by vigilantes. At Friday prayers this week, Yousef Qureshi, a hardline cleric from the Mohabat Khan mosque in Peshawar, offered a reward of 500,000 rupees ($5,800) to “those who kill Aasia Bibi.”

Even if pardoned, Rehman notes grimply, Noreen will no longer be able to to live in her community. For her own safety, she will have to be moved — simply for defending her right to choose her own faith.

Source: TIME

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