Posts tagged ‘Taliban ISI Alliance’

January 24, 2011

Book Review: The Bhutto Murder Trail: From Waziristan To GHQ – by Amir Mir

by admin


About the Book

‘It is no longer important if I become the prime minister for the third time. What is important is that my country is in danger. So I had to return even if it meant risking my life…’—Benazir Bhutto, hours before she was assassinated in Rawalpindi. Drawing on personal anecdotes, meetings, off-therecord conversations with Benazir Bhutto, and the

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December 31, 2010

BB assassination probe: ‘Murder plot hatched at brigadier’s home’

by admin

GHQ ready to put any accused officer on trial as president keeps military leadership in the loop.

A fresh probe has uncovered the role of nine men, including an army brigadier, in the December 27, 2007 assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto. Theassassination plot was hatched in the official

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December 28, 2010

An account of invaluable services of the ISI to the nation – by Muhammad Ali

by admin

ISI, the Inter Services Intelligence, an agency members of whom were found guilty of raping more than 35000 women in East Pakistan. 1386 members of the famous ISI were recommended to be trailed in the Hamood ur Rehman Commission’s report.

ISI, the Inter Services Intelligence, an agency which made millions of petro-dollars in the Afghan War. Tempering the myth of Jihad was an easy job on hand with lush green dollars. General Akhtar Abdul Rehman and Hameed Gull exported children of poor helpless mothers for the Jihad e Afghanistan when their own sons were studying in the United States.

ISI, the Inter Services Intelligence, an agency that sold Stinger Missiles received as an aid in the black market. Upon an inspection, the Ojhri Camp blasted out bringing the doom’s day for the citizens of Rawalpindi and Islamabad.

ISI, the Inter Services Intelligence, an agency which holds the prestige of looting the nation via Mehran Bank Scandal. Lt. Gen Asad Durrani the then DG ISI alone made 1.6 billion in the filthy trade.

ISI, the Inter Services Intelligence, an agency which took clothes off the Baloch Women. Zarina Marri, a Baloch school teacher was abducted by the ISI and gang-raped, she was further used as a humiliation tool for the Baloch Nationalists.

ISI, the Inter Services Intelligence, an agency which is involved in the human trade. General Pervez Musharraf exclusively explains in his books the norms of human trafficking. 500 U.S. dollars was the rate of each Pakistani citizen sold to the U.S. That included Dr Aafia Siddiqi and several others.

There is a lot more to say about the “Prestigious and Patriotic” role of he ISI but these facts might not ruin the show of our clowns in the blog-sphere.

“ISI is committed to defending our borders.”

ISI, the Inter Services of Intelligence, an agency which only holds political scandals on its credit sheet. ISI has on numerous occasions tried to subvert the elected governments. ISI is the name of a filthy political player.

ISI managed to create IJI, a right wing alliance to counter the Leftist Pakistan Peoples Party though an alliance of the Pakistan Muslim League and several religio-political parties including the Sipah-e-Sahaba, Jamaat-e-Islami and others. For this purpose, ISI used state money and resources to bring the fundamentalists on political front.

ISI tried to over-throw the elected government of Benazir Bhutto via Saudi riyals. ISI distributed huge sums of money in the right wing politicians to buy loyalties of pro-Benazir Bhutto parliamentarians.

ISI distributed millions in right wing politicians in order to ensure their victory against Benazir Bhutto.

ISI rigged the elections 2002 to ensure the victory of its divine master Pervez Musharraf. The ISI chief Lt. General Ehtashnm Zameer later confessed the fact in the Pakistani media.

A lot more can be written on what ISI’s real role is, but the clowns of the establishment in Pakistan’s mainstream and alternative media might find it hard to ruin their show.

I will just give a glimpse of what “ISI has done to protect the borders of Pakistan.”

ISI briefed the MO branch on the possible reaction of the Indian side on the Kargil Adventure. According to ISI India will at the most move forward with Special Operatives and try taking back the Tiger Hill. There are rare chances of application of artillery as India would try not to agitate Pakistan. Role of Air Force or Navy is beyond possibility grounds. India will never look forward to a full scale war. All these fables of ISI were flushed to gutter when India respond to Kargil drama with full might and Pakistan Army had to accept the bodies of it’s soldiers with humiliation.

Pakistan is under attack but by whom?

Pakistan is under attack by the filthy politically motivated generals of Pakistan Army and its political and jihadi operatives.

All the terrorists today were given birth by the Pakistan Army in early 1980s under the Riyal-Dollar umbrella. These mujahhideen of the past have turned blood sucking beasts of today’s Pakistan and Afghanistan. The lives of hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis go in the credit sheet of Pakistan Army.

Today Balochistan lies at the brink of demise. Thanks to Pakistan’s myopic generals, Balcohistan now does not see a way back. The genocide and rapes in Balochistan have yielded perfect results, Balochs are not ready to forget the humiliation they were served with.

“Ahmed Qureshi is a Patriotic Pakistani”

Yes Ahmed Qureshi, the ISI’s stooge in Pakistani media (along with other more refined operatives who keep on reinforcing the military establishment’s narrative on Taliban, India, drone attacks, politicians etc) is patriotic to the extent that he spends days and nights making up stories which have no farthest connection to reality.

In the words of this patriot:

“Yes we need to create more fake stories that appeal to the audience, like the one created about the Israeli Primer David Ben Gorian to have more guys attracted towards Pakistan.”

Sorry LUBP is not that patriotic we publish which is the truth!

“You people will be liable for high treason when a revolution comes”

I guess the clown brigade is once again looking forward to the politically and financially corrupt generals of the nation.

Let us prepare some lushing medals for Pakistan Army as their achievement sheet does not seem to end. Even a glimpse is hectic to watch:

1. Land Grabbing: The colonial tradition of land grabbing by military officers continued unabated during the past three years.

a) 111 armed forces men have allotted to themselves at least 400 or more kanals each of prime land in Bahawalpur and Rahimyar Khan districts, heart of Punjab, “to defend it from the enemy,” at the throw away rate of Rs 47.5 per kanal, while the real price in those areas ranges 15,000 to 20,000 rupees per kanal. Thus 35,000 kanals of land were distributed among 111 military men in one case alone. Theypaid 1,662,500 rupees at the nominal rate of 47.5 rupees per kanal, while the real price comes to 700 million rupees.

The list includes the names of:

· General Pervez Musharraf, Current President, 400 kanals in Nouabad village, Yazman, Bahawalpur.

· General Moinuddin Haider, Current Interior Minister, 400 kanals in Chak DB/43.

· General Aziz, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, 400 kanals in Chak DB/44.

· Lt. General Khalid Maqbool (Current Governor Punjab), 400 kanals in Chak 54/p.

· Major General Muzaffar Usmani (Later promoted to Lt General and retired recently as Deputy Chief of Army Staff Musharraf), 400 kanals in Chak 93/p.

· Lt. General Muhammed Afzal Janjua, 400 kanals in Chak 54/p

(i) 64 serving and retired officers of colonel to general rank got 400 kanals or more. They include:

10 Generals, 9 Lt. Generals, 16 Maj. Generals, one Admiral, one Air Marshal, 18 Brigadiers, 5 Lt. Colonels and 3 Colonels.

They paid 19,000 rupees for 400 kanals of land worth 400,000 rupees at market ratesif the land is unirrigated. The value of irrigated land in these areas is much higher.

(ii) 47 non-commissioned officers also got plots of agricultural land measuring 200 kanals or less.

Many of the generals have already sold their lots earning millions of rupees in profit at market rates, while others have turned into feudal lords with hired labor toiling for them.

b) Former Chairman of national Accountability Bureau Lt. Gen. Muhammed Amjad was allotted a 2-kanal (1000 sq. yd.) plot in Lahore, with a market value of 10 million rupees, against mere 800,000 rupees payable in 20 years. Invested in Defense Saving Certificates, those 800,000 rupees would multiply to 225 million rupees. He immediately sold half of the plot for 4.5 million rupees earning a profit of 8.2 million rupees on one plot.

c) General Musharraf has acquired a commercial plot, with the market value of 20 million rupees, in Defense Society, Lahore, for mere 100,000 rupees that he will pay in installments spread over 20 years. The General has neither showed this piece of land in his assets, nor sold it. If 20 million rupees are invested in the Defense Saving Certificates, they would grow up to about 500 million rupees. He owns several plots in other localities with a total market value of 200 million rupees. He has gifted a house with a market value of 20 million rupees to his daughter, which he has not shown in his assets. The 400 kanal agricultural plot that he got in Bahawalpur is also not mentioned in his assets.

d) The ISI has forced Environment Minister Shahida Jameel to allot 100 acres of land in the Margalla Hills National Park, one of the big attractions of the capital city. The agency wants to construct a new and “safe” Headquarter as well as, quite intriguingly, a housing colony for its officers. An official summary generated by Barrister Jameel’s ministry has been sent to President Pervez Musharraf, for an urgent decision. Initially the Environment Ministry response was one of alarm, as giving away 100 acres on these hills would almost destroy the whole area as a natural park, which needed to be preserved. When the ISI bosses learned about it, they immediately contacted the Minister and “convinced” her about the immediate need of 100 acres. The lady, naturally, could not resist the pressure. Again, the Generals would grab the best pieces for their homes.

e) Another 100 acres is being selected in Bahawalpur for the outgoing Naval Chief. Defense officials’ teams have been seen visiting Bahawalpur to select these 100 acres, while an offer had also been made to the outgoing Chief to become Pakistan’s Ambassador to Tunisia. The Chief wants to be Ambassador to France and his argument is that his force has a lot to buy from France, like the Augusta submarines his predecessor Admiral Mansurul Haq bought.

f) In a report, after a random check of 4 out of 11 military estate offices in 2000 –2001, Director General of Audit of the Defense Services has found close to five billion rupees loss caused by misuse of land, mismanagement and encroachments. According to an analyst, “the report is an outright indictment of the military, as it not only shows the monumental size of the lands acquired, but also the losses being caused are gigantic, compared to peanuts for which politicians are persecuted day in and day out.”

g) The Defense Housing Authority has been grabbing large chunks of valuable residential land at nominal prices around the country for the exclusive benefit of officers of the armed forces. For instance, in January 2001, the Sindh Governor bypassed the Sindh High Court stay orders, and permitted sale of highly valuable 200 acres of coastal land along Clifton, Karachi, at embarrassingly low rates to Defense Housing Authority. The land valued at market rate of Rs. 4,000/- per square yard was sold to Defense Housing Authority at Rs 20/- per square yard. Thus, the governor caused a staggering loss worth billions of rupees to the exchequer! An acre contains 4840 square yards. The real cost of 200 acres, multiplied by 4,000 per sq. yd. comes to 3.872 billion rupees

2. Defense Purchases: The submarine purchase scam involving Mansurul Haq is only a tip of the iceberg. Many more such deals with heavy kickbacks are hidden in the military closets. A large of deals for purchase of tanks, submarines, mine hunters, Mirage aircraft and army jeeps were signed through the Army Welfare Trust, Sheen Foundation and Bahria Foundation. It is estimated that various military officers pocketed commissions totaling 5.7 billion rupees in these deals.

a) A former NAB Chairman is reported to have written to the three service chiefs to provide records of certain arms deals, but NAB still awaits an answer.

b) The records could provide proof to the allegation that a former air chief Abbas Khatak received three million dollars (180 million rupees) in the purchase of 40 old Mirage aircraft for 120 million dollars. He is also accused of receiving kickbacks in deals for French missiles and Italian radars.

c) Another former air chief Farooq Feroze Khan is suspected of receiving 5 percent commission on purchase of 40 F-7 aircraft for 271 million dollars.

d) In 1996, Army bought 1047 GS-90 jeeps at 20,889 dollars per jeep, while the market price of the jeep was 13,000 dollars. NAB sources have been reported saying that some senior army officers pocketed 8.5 million dollars (510 million rupees).

e) The British Inland Revenue Services wrote a confidential letter to the Central Board of Revenue (CBR) in Islamabad to confirm a payment of five million pound sterling (450million rupees) in commission to an Islamabad-based Pakistani citizen who had acted as an intermediary between the British agent of an American company and the Pakistan Army for an 80 million pound sterling deal.

When summoned to the CBR in Islamabad for confirmation about the payment he had received from London, the Pakistani agent stunned the then chairman CBR Moinuddin Khan by acknowledging, unhesitatingly, that he had received the amount mentioned in the letter.

This shadowy businessman soon dropped a bombshell by disclosing that he got only 200,000 (2 lakh) pounds from the total payment of five million pounds (50 lakh pound) while the remaining amount was distributed among four senior officers of the Army. He also provided an actual breakdown of the payments and impressed upon the then CBR chairman that the then Chief of Army Staff had personally authorized the contract, meaning the COAS was also involved in corruption.

Within next few days a retired major general, who was the former Director General Weapons and Equipment (DGW & E) at the GHQ and had structured the deal with the American company through its British agent, approached the top CBR official and briefed him as how the disclosure and any probe into this deal would jeopardize the national security interest of the country.

After a flurry of activities between the CBR and some retired military officials, the CBR shelved the matter. This controversial deal is understood to be in the knowledge of the present military set-up, but there is nothing on the ground to suggest that it is being probed afresh

Around June/July this year, Pakistan Army awarded a contract for purchase of 1000 Hino trucks at $40,000 per truck, while the Gandhara Industries had offered Isuzu truck of same specifications at $25,000. As per standard procedures for bulk military purchases in Pakistan, no international tenders were invited but tender documents were sent to four pre-selected companies for procurement of 1,000 5-ton 4×4 trucks (ammunition carrier vehicle) by the director general military purchase on April 10. Gandhara Industries sources dispute the Army’s claim that their vehicle was not approved as 5-ton ammunition carrier. The Isuzu trucks were delivered to the Army for extended trial in February and after two months of trials the vehicle was finally short-listed and approved as 5-ton ammo carrier at the GSEEC meeting held on April 13. However, the top brass made final decision in favor of the Hino trucks. The loss to the national exchequer in this deal, at the rate of $15,000 per truck amounted to $15,000,000 (900 million rupees).

g) Pakistan Army’s purchase of more than 3,000 Land Rover trucks in 1995 had also generated controversy with the allegation that the owner of Sygma motors, which had supplied the vehicles, was closely associated with the then chief of general staff of the Pakistan Army. Corruption amounting to 2 billion rupees is alleged in that deal.

h) The Field General Court Martial (FGCM) sentenced former Naval Intelligence Chief Commodore Shahid to 7 years of hard labor, but former Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Fasih Bukhari wrote off his sentence after three months, which he had spent in the comfort of his home. It is believed he was freed after he threatened to disclose many more shady deals including a 250 million dollars purchase of mine sweepers.

i) In April 2001, the Public Accounts Committee ordered court trial of 22 corrupt officers of Garrison Engineers (Army) Rawalpindi for causing over a loss of over one billion rupees to the national exchequer with dubious purchases and embezzlement. Defense Ministry officials present at the PAC hearing opposed publication of the culprits’ names, whereupon senior PAC member Lt. General Talat Masood (retd.) admonished them and said that hidden faces involved in corruption must be exposed.

A lot more will be provided on demand.

In the meanwhile, let us salute the saviors of the nation before we are beheaded by the patriot brigade!

December 28, 2010

Qari Saifullah Akhtar, ISI's most valued asset, resurfaces in Punjab

by admin

About
Qari Saifullah Akhtar is a senior al Qaeda military leader who operates in Paksitan. Akhtar is the influential leader of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami and commands Brigade 313, a unit in al Qaeda’s Shadow Army. Akhtar has direct links with Mullah Omar, Osama bin Laden, and Ayman al Zawahiri. Source. He is a graduate of the Deobandi Banuri madrassah in Karachi and is also a close affiliate of Fazlur-Rehman Khalil, Azam Tariq (slain leader of Sipah-e-Sahaba), Masood Azhar and Mufti Taqi Usmani.

Karsaz attack suspect resurfaces in Punjab – By Amir Mir

Source: The News, December 28, 2010

In a surprising development, Qari Saifullah Akhtar, the alleged mastermind of the October 18, 2007 twin suicide attacks on the welcome procession of Benazir Bhutto in Karachi, who had shifted his militant base to Waziristan in 2008, has resurfaced in Punjab as a free man.

However, the most astonishing aspect of his return is the fact that the fugitive ameer of the al-Qaeda and Taliban-linked militant group Harkatul Jehadul Islami (HUJI) has actually been freed by the Punjab home department.

According to well-informed sources in the Pakistani security agencies, the Qari was being kept under house arrest at an undisclosed place in the Chishtian tehsil of Punjab since August 2010 and has just been freed — almost three weeks ago — in the first week of December.

The sources say Qari Saifullah had to abandon Waziristan, his birth place, after he was wounded in a US drone attack in the area. He subsequently travelled to Peshawar and then to Rawalpindi for treatment before being arrested and taken to Lahore.

He was eventually put under house arrest in Chishtian, only to be released recently. Interestingly, his release orders coincide with the third death anniversary of Benazir who had named the Qari in her posthumous book, Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West, as a principal suspect in the attempt to kill her in Karachi, a few hours after her homecoming.

In her book, which was published in February 2008, Bhutto had narrated in detail the suicide attacks targeting her welcome procession as well as the involvement of Qari Saifullah Akhtar in the assassination bid.

She wrote: “I was informed of a meeting that had taken place in Lahore where the bomb blasts were planned… Three men belonging to a rival political faction were hired for half a million dollars…. However, a bomb maker was needed for the bombs. Enter Qari Saifullah Akhtar, a wanted terrorist who had tried to overthrow my second government. He had been extradited by the United Arab Emirates and was languishing in the Karachi central jail…. The officials in Lahore had turned to Akhtar for help. His liaison with elements in the government was a radical who was asked to make the bombs and he himself asked for a fatwa making it legitimate to oblige. He got one. The bomb blasts took place in the army cantonment area in Karachi.”

Subsequently, on February 26, 2008, the Qari was arrested by the Musharraf regime for the purpose of interrogation in the Bhutto murder, although there were many in establishment circles who believed that Qari Saifullah had actually been taken into protective custody by his spy masters.

The HUJI chief is generally considered a handy tool of the intelligence establishment. Whenever required, he is used and then dumped by his spy masters. Qari Saifullah was seized by the security agencies along with his three sons in Ferozwala, near Lahore. He was then grilled by a joint interrogation team comprising operatives from the Punjab Police, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Special Investigation Group of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA).

Although, Qari Saifullah denied having played any role in the Bhutto murder, he did tell his interrogators that since his 2007 release, he had been in contact with former ISI chief Lt Gen Hamid Gul and two other army officers who had attempted to stage a coup to topple her government in 1995.

“I was in touch with Lt Gen Hamid Gul, Maj Gen Zaheerul Islam Abbasi and Brigadier Mustansar Billa,” Qari Saifullah said in a 35-page statement submitted to the Joint Investigation Team. Hamid Gul was one of the three persons Bhutto had named as her possible assassins in a letter to Musharraf, written in October 2007. Though Gul was retired prematurely, Bhutto believed that he still maintained his former close ties with the militant groups.

Ironically, Qari Saifullah’s February 26, 2008 arrest established the fact that despite all the charges levelled against him, he had been released much before Benazir returned home. Born in January 1959 in South Waziristan, the HUJI chief is a graduate of the famous Jamia Binoria in Karachi, who was arrested and extradited from the United Arab Emirates on August 7, 2004 on charges of plotting the twin suicide attacks on General Musharraf in Rawalpindi in December 2003. But instead of trying to prosecute him, the agencies chose to keep him under detention for the next two years and nine months, without even filing any criminal charges against him, giving credence to reports that he was a handy tool of the Pakistani establishment.

The Qari’s “unprovoked” arrest was challenged in the Supreme Court in the first week of January 2005. On January 18, 2005, the apex court dismissed the petition against his arrest and directed him to first move the high court by filing a habeas corpus writ petition.

But after Benazir’s murder, it transpired that the Qari had already been released by the apex court after being told by the agencies that he was one of the “missing persons” being sought by a Supreme Court bench headed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. His name was in the list of persons being held by the agencies without any formal charges having been filed against them. But the Musharraf government had told the Supreme Court on May 5, 2007 that Qari Saifullah was not in the custody of the state agencies.

The concise report presented by the National Crisis Management Cell to the court revealed that he was engaged in militant activities somewhere in Punjab and not under detention. On May 21, 2007, the Qari suddenly reached his hometown in Mandi Bahauddin of Punjab. The release was subsequently brought to the notice of the apex court by the Ministry of Interior. Hashmat Habib, the counsel for Qari Saifullah, told the court that while setting him free, the intelligence officials had informed his client that had they not picked him up, there was a strong possibility of the American Federal Bureau of Investigation taking him away for interrogation because of his alleged al-Qaeda and Taliban links.

At the time of his arrest in August 2004 and his subsequent extradition from the UAE, the Pakistani authorities had described the development as a major blow to the al-Qaeda sponsored terrorist network and its local affiliates in Pakistan. On March 20, 2008, Qari Saifullah was produced before an anti-terrorism court in Karachi for his alleged role in the twin suicide attacks on Bhutto’s welcome procession in Karachi.

But few days later, Justice Khawaja Naveed Ahmed of the Sindh High Court released him on bail, after the investigation officer said that no evidence had been found to link him with any terrorist activity. But he was rearrested the same day under the Maintenance of Public Order (MPO) and shifted to a Karachi safe house. Two months later, on June 8, 2008, Qari Saifullah was released by Sindh Home Department as the two-month term of detention set under the MPO had expired.

Though Qari Saifullah’s role in the Karachi suicide attack could not be explored further due to an apparent lack of interest by the agencies, his previous involvement in a failed coup plot in 1995 had projected him as one of the deadliest militants who, from the establishment’s viewpoint, had gone astray.

The group of potential plotters busted by the Military Intelligence at that time included four serving army officers, headed by Major General Zaheerul Islam Abbasi. Brigadier Mustansar Billa, who had also been arrested, was described as the ideologue of the religiously motivated army men.

The arrested army officers were accused of plotting to first take over the GHQ of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi during the Corps Commanders Conference, and later overthrow the Benazir government to eventually enforce their own brand of Islamic Shariah and Khilafat in Pakistan.

Those who had plotted the coup were convicted by the Field General Court Martial (FGCM) and awarded different sentences ranging from two to 14 years on October 30, 1996. Qari Saifullah decided to become the approver for the prosecution.

After the dismissal of the second Bhutto government in 1996, he was released by the agencies; he went to Afghanistan and was inducted into the cabinet of the Taliban ameer, Mulla Omar, as his adviser on political affairs. Qari Saifullah was one of the few militant leaders from Pakistan who had escaped with Mulla Omar after the US-led Allied Forces invaded Afghanistan in October 2001.

December 28, 2010

Attack on Shia students in Karachi: An ISI-Sipah-e-Sahaba production

by admin

Photo Source: Samaa TV

Related article:

Dawn: A “cracker” of a job confusing the public with euphemisms – by Qudsia Siddiqui

A bomb blast reported at the University of Karachi today injuring at least 15 students. The blast took place outside the main cafeteria of the university when Shia students were offering the mid-day prayers.

According to SSP Naeem Sheikh it was a parcel bomb. Heavy contingents of police and rangers with rescue teams rushed to the scene and started to move the injured to the hospitals. The initial reports describe that the bomb was hidden in a small parcel and it blasted during the Zohar Prayer at a place between the mosque and cafeteria near Arts and Economics Lobby. (Source)

Six of the injured were shifted to Patel Hospital, 2 are reportedly in serious condition. (Source)

This is the first such incident at an educational institution in Karachi, though the campus often sees regular, violent clashes between rival student groups.

ے ۔کراچی کے علاقے گلشن اقبال میں واقع شہر کے اہم تدریسی سینٹر جامعہ کراچی میں دوپہر ایک بجے کیفے ٹیریا کے قریب نماز کیلئے قائم جگہ پر ایک درخت کے ساتھ دھماکا ہوا جس سے5 افراد زخمی ہوگئے،جنہیں ابتدائی طبی امداد کیلئے پٹیل اسپتال منتقل کر دیا گیا۔ دھماکے سے کراچی یونیوسٹی میں بھگدڑ مچ گئی اور طلبہ و طالبات میں خوف و ہراس پھیل گیا۔ سی سی پی او کراچی فیاض لغاری کے مطابق ہلکی نوعیت کا دھماکہ کریکر کا تھا جو ایک مذہبی طلبہ تنظیم کی نماز کی جگہ کے قریب درخت کے ساتھ ہوا۔ دھماکے سے قریبی بلاکس کے شیشے ٹوٹ گئے۔کراچی یونیورسٹی کے حفاظتی انتظامات پاکستان رینجرز اور جامعہ کی اپنی سکیورٹی کے حوالے ہیں۔ہلکے دھماکے کے بعد کسی اور دھماکے کے خدشے کے پیش نظر یونیورسٹی کو خالی کرا لیا گیا جبکہ والدین کی بری تعداد بھی طلبہ و طالبات کو لینے کیلئے یونیورسٹی پہنچ گئی۔ گلشن اقبال پولیس کے مطابق واقعہ کی تفتیش شروع کردی گئی ہے۔ دھماکے کے بعد طلبہ مشتعل ہوگئے اور انہوں نے حکومت اور انتظامیہ کے خلاف شدید نعرے بازی کی۔ آخری اطلاعات تک طلبہ یونیورسٹی روڈ کو بلاک کرکے احتجاج کررہے ہیں۔

Source: Jang

Last year, two suicide bomb blasts by extremist Deobandis (Taliban supported by the ISI) at the International Islamic University in Islamabad killed six people, including the bombers, and wounded at least 20.

It may be noted that the military establishment of Pakistan (ISI, MI, Sipah-e-Sahaba, Taliban) have recently started a wave of anti-Shia campaign in Karachi to harass the Muslim minority community.

Apparently, the main aim of Pakistan’s military establishment and its proxies in the media is to “make” public opinion on the North Waziristan operation.

Missing Shias abducted by the state

Recently, at least 10 Shias have been illegally abducted by the ISI and MI in Karachi in the last few days.

“The 10 missing Shias were abducted from different areas of the Karachi city within 10 days by the law enforcement agencies (LEAs),” Maulana Hassan Zafar Naqvi, leader of the MWM told reporters during a press conference at the Karachi Press Club, a Press TV correspondent reported on Tuesday.

Missing persons’ relatives for CJ’s help

By: Danish Rafique | Published: December 25, 2010

KARACHI – Families of 10 missing persons belonging to Shia Community have appealed to the Chief Justice to take action and help recover them from the custody of law enforcement agencies.

As per details, Maulana Mirza Yousuf along with the family members of 10 Shia men who allegedly in the custody of Law enforcement agencies held a press Conference at Karachi press Club on Friday and claimed that after the Ashura of Muhram-ulHarram the law enforcement agencies conducted raids at different Shia localities including Jafar Tyaar, North Karachi, Federal B area Cant Station and Orangi Town and apprehended several people without any charge. During the press conference, the families also carrying pictures of the missing people and raised slogans against the authorities as well as law enforcement agencies.

Mirza Yusuf in his addressed informed that that on the other side, the doctors, engineers and other intellectual of the community are being target in ongoing sectarian killing and on the other side law enforcement agencies also arresting our people without any ground. He further said that the authorities were hesitant to take stern action against the culprits of Ashura and Chehlum blasts and those who were behind the killing of Shia people while they arrested the people without any reason from their home and search warrant. He claimed that law enforcement agencies also threatened to kill the arrested men in vivid encounter if they raise their voices again their arrest. He said “Our 10 people were arrested by different raid including Husnain Abbas, resident of Orangi town, two brothers Tanveer Abbas and Mazher Abbas, residents of Sector 10 North Karachi, Pervez Zaidi, resident of Orangi town no 10, Sikander and Jhangir, resident of New Karachi 11-D. They were arrested from Cantt station, Abrar and Ali Mehdi, resident of Jaffer Tayyer,they were arrested when they returning from imam Bargah, Rafat Abbas alias Mesum and Komail, both were the resident of FB Area.” Later, the family members also appealed to Chief Justice of Pakistan, President Asif Ali Zardari, PM Yusuf Raza Gilani and Interior minister of Sindh to recover the missing men.

Source: The Nation

In video: Blast at Karachi University

…….

December 27, 2010

Strategic links between jihadi terrorists and Pakistan's military establishment

by admin


Related Article:
Dawn News Reporter – Pakistan Military’s support for militants

یہ پوسٹ جولائی ٢٠١٠ میں ڈان نیوز سے نشر ہونے
والے پروگرام رپورٹر کی دوسری قسط پر مبنی ہے. پروگرام کی ریکارڈنگ اور اہم نقاط کے اقتباسات پیش خدمت ہیں.٣٢ منٹ دورانئے کی یہ بحس پاکستان کے دفاعی اداروں میں جہادیوں کے اثر و رسوخ اور انکی سرگرمیوں کو سمجھنے کے مددگار ہے.

شرکا گفتگو

ائیر وائس مارشل شہزاد چوہدری

زاہد حسین – فرونٹ لائن پاکستان کے مصنف

ائیر مارشل مسعود اختر

ویڈیو کا پہلا حصہ

ویڈیو کا دوسرا حصہ

ویڈیو کا تیسرا حصہ

ویڈیو کا آخری حصہ

پاکستان فوج کے عسکریت پسندوں کے ساتھ مبینہ رابطے

حسین حقانی اپنی کتاب ‘پاکستان : ملا اور ملٹری کے درمیان’ میں لکھتے ہیں کے پاکستان فوج کے جہادی تنظیموں سے رابطے سٹرٹیجک ہیں اور اسی وجہ سے جہادیوں کو سرپرستی ملی اور وو پروان چڑھے

آمر میر اپنی کتاب ‘جہادیوں کا اصلی چہرہ’ میں لکھتے ہیں کے پاکستان فوج کے تقریباً پانچ جہادی تنظیموں سے تعلق رہے ہیں جن میں جہاد اسلامی، لشکر طیبہ ، لشکر جھنگوی، جیش محمّد اور حرکت المجاہدین شامل ہیں

ڈان نیوز کی ٹیم نے ٨ جولائی ٢٠١٠ کو انٹر سروسز پبلک ریلشنز (ISPR) کے سربراہ اطہر عبّاس کو ای میل بھیجی کے وو بتایں کہ کیا فوج میں جنداللہ نامی تنظیم کا وجود رہا ہے ؟ اور اگر ہاں تو وو لوگ کون تھے اور انکے خلاف کیا اقدام اٹھائے گئے . نہ تو اس ای میل کا کوئی جواب موصول ہوا اور نہ ہے انہوں نے انٹرویو کے لئے وقت دیا

ڈان نیوز کی تحقیق کے مطابق

فوج کے دو جونئیر افسران نے فروری 2000 کو کوئٹہ میں جنداللہ نامی جہادی تنظیم کی بنیاد رکھی. انکے جہاد کے پرچار سے متاثر ہو کر جلد ہے چھاؤنی کی مختلف یونٹوں کے ٣٠ فوجیوں نے جنداللہ مے شمولیت اختیار کر لی. انہوں نے باقی یونٹوں سے چندے کی وصولی کا کام بھی کیا اور اسکا کچھ حصہ افغانی طالبان کو بھی بھیجا کرتے. فوج میں پھیلنے کے لئے انہوں نے پاکستان ائیر فورس مونگلی بیس کے افسران سے تعلقات استوار کئے. انھوں نےجیکب آباد ائیر بیس کے علاوہ جنرل مشرف پر ٢٠٠٣ میں دو حملوں کی منصوبہ بندی بھی کی. پاکستان ائیر فورس کے ایک سربراہ کا کہنا ہے کہ انٹر سروس انٹلیجنس (ISI) کی طرف سے انکو جیکب آباد حملے سے متعلق کوئی معلومات نہیں دی گیئں تھیں. جنداللہ کے کالعدم تنظیم جیش محمّد سےقریبی روابط رہے اور انہوں نے فوج اور ائر فورس کی مختلف یونٹوں اور رجمنٹوں مے اثر و رسوخ قائم کر لیا. جیش محمّد نے جنداللہ کے کارکنوں کو بالاکوٹ میں تربیت دلوائی اور انکی مالی معاونت بھی کی. جنرل مشرّف پر حملے کے بعد فوج سے جنداللہ کا اس حد تک خاتمہ کیا گیا کہ انکے بہت سے کارکنوں کو گرفتار کیا گیا. ان کو سزا تو دے دی گئی پر ان تنظیموں کا وجود اب بھی ہے اور یہ اپنا جہادی لٹریچر دھڑلے سے چھاپتے اور پھیلاتے ہیں

لیفٹننٹ جنرل حامد نواز پروگرام سے اٹھ کر چلے جاتے ہیں

عوامی رائے :
افغان جنگ کے دوران پاکستان آرمی نام نہاد جہاد میں پوری طرح شامل تھی اور طالبان سمیت تمام جنگجوں سے اسکے تعلقات تھے. مگر ٩/١١ کے بعد صورت حال بدل گئی اور آج یہ نوبت ہے کہ فوج اپنے ہی پیدا کئے ہوے بچے سے لڑ رہی ہے

حکومت کو فوج کے بجٹ اور جہادی تنظیموں کے فنڈس کا احتساب کرنا چاہیے اور نظر رکھنی چاہیے کے یہ فنڈس کہاں سے آتے ہیں اور کہاں جاتے ہیں

ایجنسیوں کے طالبان یا مجاہدین سے تعلقات ہونا کوئی تعجب کی بات نہیں ہے

افغان جہاد کے دنوں میں پاکستان فوج اور مجاہدین نے مل کر جنگ لڑی اور جیتی. اس دور کے فوجی افسران اب یا تو ریٹایر ہو چکے ہیں یا ہونے والے ہیں. انکے ذاتی طور پر اپنے پرانے مجاہدین ساتھیوں سے تعلقات ہو سکتے ہیں پر جس طرح بین ال اقوامی میڈیا کہتا ہے وو غلط ہے

امریکا کے افغان طالبان سے گہرے روابط ہیں جو پاکستان آرمی اور طالبان کے روابط سے کہیں مضبوط ہیں. انکے تعلقات افغان جہاد کے دنوں سے ہیں

پاکستان کے دفاعی اداروں اور ایجنسیوں کے کسی شدّت پسند جماعت سے کوئی تعلقات نہیں ہیں. وو صرف ملکی دفاع اور قومی مفاد میں کام کر رہے ہیں. فوجی افسران جن پر ہمارا لاکھوں روپیہ خرچ ہو رہا ہے، ان میں سے درجنوں شہید ہو چکے ہیں. اگر انکے روابط جہادیوں سے ہوتے تو ان جہادیوں کا شکار فوج کیوں ہے ؟

زاہد حسین کہتے ہیں کہ بھارتی طیارہ ہائی جیک کیس بھی جیش محمّد سے جڑا ہے. اور اس واقعے کے بعد اپنے دیکھا کہ مسعود اظہر نے کھلے عام کراچی میں ایک بارے مجمے سے اجتماع میں خطاب کیا

میزبان کا سوال: ضیاء دور میں تو فوج میں جہادی تربیت اور مذہب کا استمال عام تھا . کیا مشرّف دور میں اسمے کوئی تبدیلی آئی ؟
جواب میں شہزاد چوہدری کہتے ہیں کہ مذہب کا استمال تو پاکستان بنانے کی تحریک میں بھی ہوا. اسکے بعد ١٩٤٨ کی پاک بھارت کشمیر جنگ میں بھی جناح نے قبائلیوں کے لشکر تیار کروا کر انسے جنگ لڑی. اسی طرح ١٩٦٥ میں آپریشن جبرالٹر ذولفقار علی بھٹو اور جنرل اختر علی ملک کا نظریہ تھا جسکے مطابق آپنے یہ کہا کہ ہم غیر ریاستی فوج یا جہادیوں کو استمال کر کہ کشمیر میں قدم جمایئں گے

ائیر مارشل مسعود اختر کہتے ہیں کہ ضیاء الحق کے زمانے کا ایمان، تقویٰ، جہاد فی سبیل اللہ ایک نظریے کے طور پر بوہت مقبول ہوا. مشرف نے ٩/١١ کے بعد یو ٹرن لیا مگر اس نظریے کے اثرات اب تک باقی ہیں اور انکو زائل ہونے میں وقت لگ رہا ہے. ان لوگوں کا یہ نظریہ تھا اور ہے کہ یہ ملک انتہائی دایئں بازو کے لوگوں کے لئے بنا ہے

زاہد حسین کہتے ہیں کہ پاکستان کا مقصد اور اس سے منسلک مباحث تو پاکستان کے وجود سے ہے شروع ہو گیئں لیکن ریاستی اکثریت کا نظریہ ١٩٨٠ کی دہائی میں زور پکڑنا شروع ہوا. سوویت قوت کے خلاف عوامی راے بنانے اور لوگوں کو لڑنے کے لئے آمادہ کرنے کے لئے اسلام کا بڑی بے رحمی سے استمال کیا گیا. یہ تجربہ کامیاب رہا اور دنیا بھر کے مسلمان ملکوں سے لوگ جہاد کے لئے آ پوھنچے مگر اب وہ ہمارے قابو میں نہیں ہیں. جہاد کا ریاستی پالیسی کے طور پے استمال ضرور رہا ہے مگر اسکی بنیاد نظریاتی نہیں بلکہ سٹرٹیجک (حربی) تھی.

سوال: مشرف پر حملوں کے سلسلے میں ائیر فورس کے ١٠٦ افسران برطرف کے گئے اور ٥٧ فوجی بھی اسی سلسلے میں پکڑے گئے. ان لوگوں میں ان رجحانات کی وجہ کیا تھی ؟

ائیر وائس مارشل شہزاد چوہدری کہتے ہیں ١٩٧٩ سے ١٩٨٩ تک پاکستان فوج اور امریکا نے جہاد، اسلام اور جہادیوں کا استمال کیا اور مقصد پورا ہو جانے کے بعد انکو لاوارث چھوڑ دیا. یہ ایک ناکام پالیسی کا نتیجہ ہے کہ آج وہی ہمارے گلے پڑ چکے ہیں. ہمارے ملک میں کل ملا کر ٣٠،٠٠٠ اموات ہو چکی ہیں اور ان میں سے فوجیوں کی تعداد تو تقریباً ١٩٦٥ کی جنگ کی شہادتوں کے قریب پوھنچ گیئ ہے

حملوں کی پلاننگ کرنے والوں فوجیوں کے وکیل کہتے ہیں کے ان ٦ لوگوں کے خلاف ٹھوس ثبوت دستیاب تھے جو کورٹ کو دیے گئے. پاکستان ائیر فورس میں مذہبیت کا رجحان باقی دفاعی اداروں سے زیادہ ہے.
ائیر مارشل مسعود اختر کہتے ہیں پاکستان فضایہ میں جہادیوں نے اس لئے گھسنا پسند کیا کیوں کہ وو جانتے تھے کہ یہ لوگ باقی دفاعی اداروں کی نسبت زیادہ ماہر اور کاریگر ہیں اور ہر قسم کے ہتھیاروں سے اچھی طرح واقف ہیں. ہم نے ان رجحانات کو ختم کرنے کے لئے اقدامات اٹھایئں ہیں. ہم تمام افسران اور فوجیوں پڑ کاری نگرانی رکھتے ہیں. بھرتی ہونے والوں کے لئے ہم نے سخت نفسیاتی ٹیسٹ بنایا ہے. ہم کوشش کر رہے ہیں کہ فوجیوں کو قرآن کی ہدایت کے مطابق وسط کا راستہ دکھائیں. ہم انکو یہ بھی سمجھا رہے ہیں کہ امیر کی اطاعت ضروری ہے، یہ قرآن اور حدیث میں بھی ہے.

فوج کے ایک معلم جو جمعہ کے خطبے دیتے ہیں کا کہنا ہے

افغانستان پر امریکی حملے کے بعد ہمیں کہا گیا کہ اپنے افغانستان کا ذکر نہیں کرنا. لیکن کچھ دیر بعد جب حالات سخت ہوے تو مجھے کمانڈنگ افسر نے بلا کر کہا کے ہر یونٹ میں جا کر ایسا لیکچر دو کہ ہمارے جوانوں کو آگ لگ جائے اور لیکچر کا موضوع صرف جہاد ہونا چاہیے. حالانکہ پہلے مجے اسی سے روکا گیا تھا.

زاہد حسین کا کہنا ہے کہ اس چیز کی کبھی بھی اجازت نہیں دی گئی کہ جہادی فوج میں اپنا راستہ بنایں مگر عسکریت، جہاد اور اسلام کا استمال ریاستی پالیسی ضرور رہا ہے. اسکے اثرات فوج پر پڑے. ائیر وائس مارشل شہزاد چوہدری کہتے ہیں کہ دہشت گردی اور مذہبیت وہ دو ازدہے ہیں وو آگے چل کر اس ملک کو کھایئں گے.

Source: Roshni

December 19, 2010

Pakistan's most lucrative product – by Zalaan

by admin

Related article:

Online factories of suicide bombers: An ISI production

پاکستان کی سب سے نفع بخش ایجاد

دنیا کے سارے ممالک ایک بڑی تجارتی نمائش میں شریک ہوئے جہاں وہ اپنے ملک کی بنی ہوئے اشیا بیچ رہے تھے

بنگلادیش نے کہا ہمارے پاس چاول ہیں ،گارمنٹس ہیں
سعودی عرب اپنے تیل اور اس سے بنی ہوئے چیزیں بیچ رہا تھا
چین کے پاس ساری دنیا کی سستی پروڈکٹس تھیں
انڈیا انفارمیشن ٹیکنالوگی ،ٹیکسٹائل ،افرادی قوت ،چاول اور بہت سی پروڈکٹ کے اسٹال لگایا ہوا تھا
مغربی اور ترقیافتہ ممالک طرح کی نئی ٹیکنالوجی ،تعلیم ،مہارت اور جدید اسلحہ ،جہاز ،کاریں وغیرہ بیچ رہے تھے

ان امیر اور غریب ممالک کے درمیان ایک بلکل منفرد اسٹال تھا جو پاکستان کا تھا

باقی سارے ممالک کے نمائندے سوٹ بوٹ اور اپنے علاقائی لباس پہنے ہوئے تھے پاکستانی اسٹال کی خاص بات یہ تھی کے اس پر ایک ریٹایر برگیڈئر صاحب فوجی وردی پہنے ہے بیٹھے تھے اور واحد غریب ملک تھا جو اسلحہ اور میزائل بیچ رہا تھا

جب برگیڈئر صاحب سے پوچھا گیا کہ کیا یہ اتنی اچھے معیار کہ آپ ترقیافتہ ممالک کی ٹیکنالوجی کا مقابلہ کر سکیں تو اس پر انہوں نے کہا کہ ہم نے آیڈیا دوہزار کیا تھا پر زیادہ بزنس نہیں کیا پر ایک دن ہم ضرور بڑے ممالک کی صف میں کھڑے ہوئے ہونگے کیوں کے ہم ایک ایٹمی قوت ہیں

جب ان سے پوچھا گیا کے پاکستان کے پاس کون سی ایسی پروڈکٹ ہے جس سے بیچ کر پاکستان کی عوام کی حالت بہتر ہو سکتی ہے اور پاکستان کی معیشت پروان چڑھ سکے تو اس پر وردی والے صاحب نے جواب دیا کے وہ ہے “طالبان اور مذہبی دہشتگردی

انہوں نے مزید بتایا کہ، ہے تو یہ امریکا کی پروڈکٹ ، پر ہم نے پاکستان میں اس کو اور موڈیفائی کیا ہے . جب ہم نے اسے ایجاد کیا تھا اور چلایا تھا تو بھی ہمیں خاصا زر مبادلہ حاصل ہوا تھا اور اسے ختم کرنے کے لئے بھی ہم اچھا خاصا بزنس کر رہے ہیں .ہماری یہ مذہبی طالبانی پروڈکٹ اندرونی اور بیرونی دونوں طرف سے بزنس لا سکتی ہے ملک کے اندر سویلین حکومت گرانے اور ڈرانے کے لئے اور بیرون ملک ایکسپورٹ کر کے سرمایا لانے کے لئے

انہوں نے مزید بتایا کہ ہر آپریشن کرنے سے پہلے ملک کی حکومت اور ساری دنیا ہمارے آگے ہاتھ جوڑتی ہے اور ہم پر ڈالروں کی بارش کر دیتی ہے جس سے ہمارے ملک میں خاصا پیسا آجاتا ہے اور اگر پیسا آنا کم ہو جائے تو ہم اپنی اس طالبانی پروڈکٹ کی پیداوار پڑھا دیتے ہیں اور اندرونی اور بیرونی خطرات پڑھا دیتے ہیں جس سے پھر لوگ سرمایاکاری شر و ع کر دیتے ہیں

ساری دنیا کے ملکوں نے اپنی عوام کی حالت بہتر بنانے کے لیہ اپنی مصنوعات بیچیں اور خریدیں اور پاکستان نے ساری دنیا سے پاکستان میں “دفاعی ” شعبوں میں سرمایا کاری پر زور دیا اور پاکستان کو “نا قبل تسخیر ” بنانے کے لیہ دفاعی مصنوعات پر کی معاہدے کئے تاکے ملک میں بسنے والے کچھ لوگوں کا معیار زندگی اور بہتر ہو سکے

باقی سوال رہا غریب عوام کا تو اس کی ذمہ داری سویلین حکومت کی ہے .طالبان پروڈکٹ کی وجہ سے اگر دوسرے شعبوں میں ترقی نا ہو سکے اور بدحالی کا شکار ہوں تو ہم سویلین حکومتوں سے کہیں گے کہ ملک ملک جائیں اور پیسے کی بھیک مانگے کیوں کہ ہم دہشتگردی کے مارے لوگ ہیں اور دوسروں کی جنگ لڑ رہے ہیں اس سے بھی شاید ہمیں کچھ پیسے مل جائیں

December 19, 2010

Pakistani Shia Muslims call for end to 4-year siege of Parachinar

by admin

Tens of thousands of Shia Muslims in a Pakistani tribal region called for end to a 4-year siege of northwestern city allegedly by Taliban militants, as the blockade has increased difficulties of the people.

(Ahlul Bayt News Agency) – Tens of thousands of Shia Muslims in a Pakistani tribal region called for end to a 4-year siege of northwestern city allegedly by Taliban militants, as the blockade has increased difficulties of the people.
The demand was made by Shia Muslims in the Ashura day procession in Parachinar, the center of Kurram tribal agency.

Some two hundred thousands Shia Muslims took part in the Ashura procession, which started at 8 a.m. and continued till late night on Friday.

The procession was started from main Imambargah in Parachinar city and after passing via Kurram militia, Turi graveryard, katchery road and hazara graveyard ended in Central Imambargha at night time.

During Aazadari procession juma prayer were offered at central imambarghah while maghreeb prayer at Katchery Chowk near post office.

Through out the route of Procession mourners including all ages and children with addition to non-Muslims even Christians and hindus were beating their chests by doing ‘matam’ and zaadari. Azadars were also chanting Labik Ya Hussain, Down with USA, Down with Israel, Down with Taliban.

Addressing the biggest gathering of aazadars, ulema and scholars told that the people of Parachinar and martyrs set a new example of resisting and defeating the Taliban.

In Aazadari procession certain resolutions were adopted demanding the govt to lift four years of inhuman siege of Parachinar immediately by opening and securing main Thall- Parachinar Road.

They condemned attacks on Shia Muslims in Quetta, Peshawar and Hangu, murdering innocent children and women by yazeddi forces.

They said that if the govt does not lift the four years imposed siege and economic blockade, then they will start armed long march from Parachinar to Thall to open the main road and the responsibility will be on all concern.

Source

December 15, 2010

Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies – by Dr Ayesha Siddiqa

by admin

2011 Center for Strategic and International Studies.
The Washington Quarterly • WINTER 2011, 34:1 pp. 149-162.
DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2011.538362
Ayesha Siddiqa is the first Pakistan scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the author of Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (Pluto Press, 2007).

On October 1, 2010, the government of Pakistan shut down the supply route for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) after an incursion into Pakistan’s territory by NATO forces, killing 16 Pakistanis in collateral damage. Two days later, militants torched 28 NATO supply trucks near Shikarpur in the southern province of Sindh. These events reflect the inherent tension both in Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy and in its relationship with the United States and its allies in fighting the war in Afghanistan. The future of U.S. military operations in South Asia depends on the convergence of policies between the United States and Pakistan, but since the war began in 2001, interpreting Islamabad’s counterterrorism policy has been difficult.

Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan is rife with inherent
contradictions, caught between an inclination to fight militant forces and yet having to partner with some to strengthen its future bargaining position. The policy flows out of Pakistan’s multiple strategic requirements: its need to remain engaged with the United States, to save itself from the Taliban attacking the Pakistani state, and to fight India’s growing presence in Afghanistan. Caught between these three issues, Islamabad’s counterterrorism policy and objectives continue to lack clarity. At best, the policy illustrates the tension between Islamabad’s need to protect itself against an internal enemy and its sensitivity toward the external threat from India.

The primary flaw of Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy, however, is that it is defined and driven by the military and that institution’s strategic objectives. It is easier to use themilitary option than to address the problemof changing the basic narrative and socioeconomic conditions that drive militancy in the first place. The need to create an alternative political narrative and change the mindset in Pakistan to address those socioeconomic conditions is a far more critical issue, which receives
less attention than it deserves.

Is Pakistan Serious About Confronting Terrorism?
Pakistan has been the main ally of the United States since the start of the war on al Qaeda and other terrorist actors in 2001. Its role has become more important with time because the threat in Afghanistan has expanded into Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban are supported by groups hiding in Pakistan’s tribal areas, particularly North and South Waziristan, with the threat of militancy having seeped well into Pakistan’s provinces of Punjab, Sindh, and Baluchistan.

Militant forces have combined their strength to attack the Pakistani state and its citizens, resulting in the deaths of more than 10,000
civilians and security forces personnel since 2003.

The militants, especially the Tehrik-eTaliban Pakistan (TTP), have not desisted from attacking the Pakistani army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi and installations of the military’s primary intelligence organization, the Directorate for Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). The TTP is a network of breakaway factions from various militant groups that are not all necessarily linked with the tribal areas, but use the territory as a hideout. Although the TTP seems to be popularly identified with Hakimullah Mehsud, who represents an anti-Pakistan agenda, most other groups are from Punjab, Pakistan’s largest province. Some TTP groups have links with al Qaeda. Since 2001, the threat posed by militancy has increased as the ongoing conflict, poverty, and lack of development have made it easier for the Taliban to recruit foot soldiers. The new leaders of the various Taliban and militant groups are young men, mostly in their thirties, who are battle-hardened from the last decade and are far less willing to compromise.

Both the United States and Pakistan appear to lack clarity about how to define the threat they are facing and what are attainable objectives. Although the prospective date of U.S. withdrawal has caused its fair share of controversy, Islamabad’s counterterrorism policy suffers from its own set of problems, beginning with overemphasizing the military approach. On a superficial level, the main issue with Islamabad’s approach to fighting terrorism is that it is almost completely controlled by the armed forces.

The army has a four-tiered approach
Caught between three goals, Islamabad’s counter terrorism policy and objectives lack clarity.

clear, hold, develop, and disintegratean approach used by the army in its operations in Swat in 2007 and in South Waziristan in October 2009.

Take the Fight Where …?

The army, however, is unwilling to extend that operation into North Waziristan, which has become a bone of contention with the United States. According to Rawalpindi, the military would like to adopt a careful and layered approach to counterterrorism, by which it means it will check and destroy unfriendly forces before attending to other groups. The military is not inclined to cater to U.S. concerns about
Taliban groups in North Waziristan, who have formal and informal agreements with the Pakistani army not to attack the state if
the army does not attack them. Islamabad does not want to start a battle on all fronts and is willing to talk to militant forces that do not attack Pakistan. Pakistan has its definition of good and bad Taliban, as do all the other stakeholders in the conflict, including the United States.

Pakistan’s perspective is problematic for the United States, where
policymakers at the Pentagon and elsewhere saw the Swat and South
Waziristan operations as a change of heart in Pakistan and an expression of the country’s intention to fight. Many in the U.S. government view the present Pakistani army chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, who assumed the role in November 2007, as a more serious commander in dealing with militancy than former army chief and president Pervez Musharraf. Some of the army’s good friends among the community of journalists, such as Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan’s
former ambassador to the United States, and Shuja Nawaz, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, believe that the extension of operations into North Waziristan will happen in good time. Since the army has lost its own men in fighting militancy, it is keen to tackle the issue.

The Pakistani military is making an effort to clear Swat and South Waziristan of militants and establish control with the intent of denying them to the Taliban.

The clear and hold operation is also meant to facilitate the state’s integrating these areas into Pakistan, as they historically have not been part of the state’s legal and political systems. This process needs to be carefully staggered and gradual for two reasons. First, initiating operations on different fronts at the same time could prove dangerous and strain the military’s capabilities. It makes sense to adopt a policy that could be described as ‘‘divide and subdue.’’ But expanding operations to North Waziristan has become even more difficult in the wake of The primary flaw of Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy
is that it is driven by the military.

Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategythe recent floods, which have diverted the attention of both the military and the civilian government toward other issues. Hence, lack of time is considered a major factor.
Second, attacking the internal enemy is impossible without building public goodwill. Former ambassador Lodhi, while giving a presentation in Washington early in 2010, remarked that favorable public opinion made it possible for the army to launch the operation in Swat. Presumably, Taliban atrocities that made headlines in Pakistan helped the army build up public opinion against the militants. Shabana Fayyaz, a professor at the Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad and an expert on Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy, considers the positive opinion as a major contributor to the Swat and South Waziristan operations. Positive public opinion also is considered to be a necessary precondition for extending the operation to North Waziristan.

However, the positive opinion does not seem to have helped the army to carry its operations into North Waziristan, counter the evolution of the TTP, or take care of other militant groups inside Pakistan. This gives credence to the idea that
the military will not expand its operations to include all Taliban groups. There
are three kinds of forces which operate inside Pakistan: the ‘‘friendly’’ or good
Taliban in North Waziristan; the ‘‘unfriendly’’ or bad Taliban in North
Waziristan, South Waziristan, Swat, and rest of the country in the form of the TTP; and other ‘‘friendly’’ militants such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jamaatud-Dawa (JuD), and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). The army does not seem willing to develop public goodwill against these ‘‘friendly’’ groups through a pro-active use of public and private media, which were used effectively in the case of the Swat and South Waziristan operations. This is despite the fact that the army’s main narrative revolves around presenting itself and the country as victims of terrorism.

Reportedly, even General Kayani has expressed to the United States his
reservations about launching operations against Sirajuddin Haqqani, Hafiz Gul Bahadar, and Mullah Nazeer, who are holed up in areas bordering Afghanistan and pose a threat to U.S. and NATO forces.1

Bahadar and Nazeer are significant Taliban warlords in NorthWaziristan, while Haqqani heads what is known as the Haqqani network, which has strongholds in the bordering Afghan districts of Paktia and Khost and is known to help anti-U.S. and anti-NATO operations.
Pakistan considers the Haqqani network as reconcilable, as it did not attack Pakistani troops when they launched an offensive in South Waziristan against Hakimullah Mehsud and other hostile militants.
TheU.S. commander inAfghanistan,General David Petraeus, seems unable to convince General Kayani of the need to attack elements that the White House and the Pentagon consider unfriendly. Pakistan seems to be pushing the United States to negotiate with the Haqqani network, as the network is considered to be fundamental to the future of Afghanistan. Reportedly, Rustum Shah Mohmand, Pakistan’s former ambassador to Afghanistan who is also a member of the Pakistan—Afghanistan jirga, believes that an operation in North Waziristan will
cost Pakistan dearly.2

?against whom …
The threat posed by the TTP is difficult to counter because of the conceptual confusion within Pakistan’s establishment. The TTP is not a homogenous group, but an umbrella organization which allows militants or breakaway factions from a large number of organizations to share resourcesincluding manpowerto carry out their ideological battle. Although belonging to various religious schools of thought, the militants are inspired by the Muslim theologian Ibn Taymiyyah’s philosophy of waging war against the non-Muslim world and using violence against Muslims who do not agree with a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam.

The TTP does not have a central command and is comprised of Pashtun Pakistani militants from groups based in mainland Pakistan such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangavi, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), JeM, and LeT. Besides LeT, which is Salafist, all the other groups have the same broad ideology froma different Islamic school of thoughttheDeobandi schoolwhich they also share with the Afghan Taliban.Most also have some links with al Qaeda (see Figure 1), but groups such as the SSP predate alQaeda and have old links with
the global terrorist network.

The TTP is a franchise of al Qaeda, with similar structures. It also draws strength from the SSP, which is considered the leading organization amongst the

Figure 1:

Deobandi groups. There also are deep links between al Qaeda and the TTP because al Qaeda has acquired a more local character over
the years. According to Aamir Rana, an expert on terrorism, militant commander Ilyas Kashmiri, who leads HUJI, is also now the new leader of al Qaeda in Pakistan. 3

Rana believes that the July 2, 2010 terrorist attack against a Sufi shrine in Lahore represented an internal scuffle for the leadership of al Qaeda’s
Pakistani franchise. This indicates that al Qaeda in Pakistan is not necessarily dominated by Arabs, but has a strong local component. It is a platform for all the militants who follow the ideology of takfir (the process of declaring someone as a nonbeliever and hence impure). The Takfiris among the Salafists, Wahhabis, and Deobandis three broad schools of thought in Islamtend to declare war against anyone who is considered a non-believer. Ayman al-Zawahiri is considered to be the ideologue of takfiri ideology in al Qaeda.4

However, the takfir ideology has spread among other militant groups, which has allowed some militants to break away from parent organizations and merge into the TTP. The TTP believes in waging jihad even against Muslims who help non-Muslims or do not fight un-Islamic rule. Such a belief compels them to wage war against
Pakistani forces, as they are considered to be toeing the U.S. line and fighting a war that is not Pakistan’s.

The list of friendly militants does not end with those present in North
Waziristan. Pakistan’s army is equally unwilling to eliminate other militant
groups which have found safe haven in mainland Pakistan. LeT, which came to international attention because of its involvement in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and JeM have a long partnership with the army for what Rawalpindi considers strategic reasons.

Pakistan’s Preoccupation
The Pakistani army’s other major concern is India’s presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s military establishment believes that India is fomenting instability in Pakistan’s southwestern province of Baluchistan, and that this can only be checked by a policy of counterforce.5

The growing conventional and non-conventional military balance in India’s favor compels Pakistan’s military commanders to continue supporting proxy war as a policy tool. The Kashmir issue is central to Pakistan military’s interests, and LeT and JeM remain relevant to the army in this theater. When directly asked about the LeT The Pakistani army has been unwilling to extend counterterrorism operations into North Waziristan.

leadership’s views on sectarian violence, the organization’s spokesman, Yahya Mujahid, claimed that his militant outfit did not contribute to internal violence in Pakistan, given that its main objective is to
emancipate Kashmir and Kashmiri Muslims from India’s control.6

Following U.S. citizen David Headley’s arrest and admission that
he had been involved with LeTand played a role in the 2008Mumbai attacks, LeT has insisted that it is only interested in jihad against India. The organization’s leadership wants to distance itself from any
evidence linking it with global terrorism or sectarian strife inside Pakistan. Similarly, JeM, which was created in 2001 primarily to increase tension in Indian-held Kashmir, maintains close links with the Pakistani army and its intelligence agencies. Some sources say that Masood Azhar, the founder and leader of JeM, is comfortably ensconced in Karachi.7

Interestingly, he may not be the only militant in Karachi, as there is talk that some prominent Afghan Taliban also are present in the city. It was not surprising, therefore, when the Taliban’s top military commander, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, was captured in Karachi in February 2010.

Rawalpindi’s use of militancy as a strategic tool is a risky option, but is
nonetheless considered doable. The army’s argument about the battle between itself and the Taliban, and the sacrifices of the army’s men, creates a powerful narrative that helps stall criticism (and potential reevaluation) about this policy from outside the organization. The public and private media in the country present the military’s logic. Most private media outlets go so far as to find a joint ‘‘CIA—RAW—Mossad’’in other words, U.S.—Indian—Israelihand in every terrorist attack that takes place inside Pakistan. This produces strong anti-Indian and anti-U.S. sentiments in the country. Curiously, this also is a popular
perception at the highest policy levels on both the civilian and military sides.

Even Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari has voiced concerns about U.S.
involvement in attacks inside Pakistan, according to BobWoodward’s account in his latest book.8

However, those views may represent President Zardari’s perception based on feedback from the armed forces, not from an independent source of information.

Zardari played a critical role in expanding Pakistan’s operations from Swat to SouthWaziristan, including putting pressure on the military. Zardari’s actions are possibly one of the reasons, as a senior foreign office official speaking in confidence said, that the army has since tried to push Zardari back from any major influence on Pakistan’s policies on Afghanistan and counterterrorism. It is Both the United States and Pakistan lack clarity about how to define the threat.

important to note that skewed civil—military relations are one of the major reasons behind Islamabad’s rather confusing counterterrorism policy.

The mindset and apparent confusion of Pakistani officials and society has made it difficult for Pakistan to put up a fight against militant forces that target the country. Despite the victory in Swat, the army was unable to catch militant leaders such as Maulana Fazlullah, head of the Taliban-backed Tehrik-e-Nifaze-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSMmovement for the implementation of Islamic Shari’a). Such failures make it difficult to boost public confidence in the government’s capacity to challenge and eliminate the Taliban, and to protect ordinary Pakistani citizens.
Maulana Fazlullah’s grip over Swat was not just a battle for the imposition of Shari’a, it was largely a matter of religiously motivated warlords establishing control over a territory where Pakistan had acceded control by not providing governance and establishing a rule of law. Initially, the people in Swat responded to Fazlullah because he called for the implementation of Shari’a law, which was perceived as a faster and more cost-effective system of justice. Fazlullah
challenged the traditional eliteknown as maliks. As his influence increased, the writ of the state, projected through the police and intelligence agencies, diminished to the point of disappearing. For ordinary people, the Taliban became more of a reality than the state.

As long as the Pakistani army continues to differentiate among the various groups on the basis of their tactical position vis `-a-vis the Pakistani state, terrorism will continue. There seems to be little intent to marginalize or eliminate the core militant groups operating inside Pakistan. This was made clear during a discussion the author had with the military’s spokesperson, Major General Athar Abbas, who termed the unfriendly Taliban as ‘‘splinters of splinters,’’ meaning that those attacking the state were just the breakaway components of otherwise friendly groups.9

It is impossible in the short to medium term for the Pakistani military to take a different look at the problem of militancy because of the outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan as well as the huge trust deficit between the neighbors. Pakistan considers India’s diplomatic and economic presence in Afghanistan as threatening Pakistan’s security, especially in Baluchistan. Not surprisingly, the chief of the ISI, Lieutenant General Shuja Pasha, once declared Taliban leaders such as Fazlullah and Baitullah Mehsud as patriots and nationalists.10

In an interview to the German magazine Der Spiegel, Pasha
similarly adopted a generous view of militant propaganda, terming it as a right in a democracy.11

The militants are considered a vital part of the army’s operational plans to counter India. Overall, the India factor has led to the seemingly divided opinion amongst the Pakistani establishment about fighting militancy, especially given that there is a deep-rooted fear of the growing strategic relationship between the United States and India. The Washington—New Delhi civil nuclear deal is seen as disturbing the balance of power in South Asia, which is detrimental to Pakistan’s interests. The friendly Taliban are a natural boost to Islamabad’s drive to protect its interests, particularly in the Kashmir dispute and thwarting the growing Indian influence in Afghanistan, which Pakistan considers detrimental to its interests.

From a tactical standpoint, the abovementioned policy is a rational outcome of Islamabad’s perception that the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is temporary.

The Pakistani army does not want to find itself in a situation where Islamabad does not have links with the Taliban and other warlords. The Afghan Taliban are significant stakeholders in Afghanistan, and it is vital for Islamabad to keep ties with them. The Pakistani military went so far as to publicly admit that their forces arrested Mullah Baradarwho was apparently engaged in a dialogue with the Karzai governmentin February 2010 to signal the Taliban that Islamabad would not allow militants to strike deals independently.12

The fact that the military admitted its gameplan indicates that it expects the United States to understand its ally’s security concerns.
Thus, what emerges is a policy in which Pakistani forces seem to ‘‘run with the hare and hunt with the hound.’’ This policy may also at least partially be a result of Pakistan’s monetary dependence on the United States. U.S. diplomats stationed in Pakistan believe that the continuation of the fight against terrorist organizations helps Islamabad extract money from Washington.13

And in reality, Pakistani forces do not want the United States to leave the region. Such views emphasize the skewed nature of Pakistani—U.S. relations. The bilateral strategic re-engagement, which started after 2001, represents a patron— client relationship. Since the linkage is based simply on Islamabad providing support for U.S. security interests in South Asia, there is a trust deficit between the two states. The bulk of Pakistani decisionmakers and military commanders believe that the U.S. interest in the region will once again wane when the United States withdraws its military from Afghanistan. Therefore, as the diplomats stated, it actually benefits Pakistan to keep the threat of terrorism alive.

It’s not Pakistan…It’s the Use of Force

Even if Pakistan were fighting the war more honestly, however, it is doubtful the military option would produce desirable results. One of the greatest flaws of the overall counterterrorism approach of the allies certainly Pakistanis the concentration on the use of force. This is not to argue that the military option should not be used at all or that the state must not protect itself against terrorists.

The military option, nevertheless, does not help eradicate militancy and
emphasizes the idea that change comes about through the use of force. In this respect, the drone attacks seem to add to the problem of militancy. Given the collateral damage of these attacks, there are always more people who join the ranks of the Taliban to avenge the death of their loved ones.

Unfortunately, the frustration of ordinary people, who are stuck between the Taliban on one side and U.S./NATO/Pakistani forces on the other, makes them more inclined toward violence than peace. Not all members of the Taliban are motivated by religion; there is a division between the Taliban leadershipwho are driven by ideologyand Taliban foot soldiers who join the fight for monetary reasons or personal vendetta. An alternative narrative that could keep people away from militancy does not yet exist in Pakistan or in the U.S. strategy to fight terrorism. Such a narrative should include two ideas: changing the socioeconomic balance in the society to deter greater Talibanization; and creating tools that could help counter the religious ideology of militant groups.

Socioeconomic Priority
Although there has been no direct link established between poverty and
terrorism, a large number of people who join militant groups are from the lowest socioeconomic class in Pakistan. South Punjab and upper Sindh, which are gaining a reputation as safe havens for terrorist elements, are known areas of high poverty. The two areas rank very low in the human development indices of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. They also rank very low in terms of education.14

Consequently, there is a large presence of madrassas (religious seminaries) in these areas which, even if they are not necessarily
producing terrorists, are definitely contributing to a mindset that encourages militancy. An increase in rural poverty in a socially authoritarian environment can create political chaos, if not outright anarchy.15

In Pakistan, poverty is not just limited to economic deprivationit also
applies to the scarcity of political power or the inability to shift the status quo. The bulk of the Pakistani middle class, which is seen by authors such as Vali Nasr as a driver of change in Muslim societies due to its progressive nature,16 is actually conservative with traces of latent radicalism. Members of this class have increasingly become more conservative, and even financed and supported militant outfits because of their inability to change the political system in any other way.17

This is not done consciously, but is driven by the realization that
orthodox religious ideology provides greater sociopolitical space than the existing system. The Pakistani state has historically failed to build an alternative narrative, and the political-party system has failed to allay the concerns of ordinary people, which creates space for radicalism and militancy to grow.

The state has not managed to correct its focus and attend to the problems of human resource and socioeconomic development. Pakistan’s human development indicators continue to be abysmal, and the government has not managed to integrate the tribal areas through development work or building a legal and law enforcement system. In fairness, the state was unlucky in one sense, as its nascent efforts to fight terrorism were seriously stalled by the floods in 2010.

Given that the natural calamity badly hit Khyber—Pakhtunkhwa, Gilgit—Baltistan, South Punjab, Sindh, and Baluchistan, the challenges have multiplied, as these are areas withmilitant groups present. Sincemilitant organizations helped provide relief, and there was no real attempt to discourage those efforts,18 it has become doubly difficult to reduce the influence of militant organizations.

Changing Religious Discourse
Pakistan also needs to create a new religious narrative. No amount of
counterterrorism operations will work unless the government has a plan to generate a new discourse that can counter takfiri ideology and the orthodox interpretation of Shari’a law. It is critical for the Pakistani government and civilsociety groups to combine forces and emphasize the fact that terrorism is linked with an ideological battle in the country. The U.S. fight against terrorism is one of the many layers of the current conflict, but the Muslims of Pakistan have to recognize the war as their own, which can only happen if a counter-argument is presented emphasizing ideological nuance.

A renowned Muslim scholar, Javed Ahmed Ghamdi, argues that unless
Muslim ideological theoreticians are able to admit that the Qur’an prohibits killing all non-combatantsbe they in Israel, Palestine, Pakistan, India, or the United Statesit will be difficult to fight terrorism successfully. Ghamdi also believes that using religion for terrorism is a tool of power and does not depict the reality of Islam (Ghamdi has aired these views publicly, for which he received death threats and had to move to Malaysia. The state was unable to provide him protection).19

Another moderate religious scholar, Dr. Farooq Khan, was killed in October 2010 by the Taliban in Swat, further muffling the voices of
reason and tolerance.20

Unfortunately, the Pakistani government has opted for the easy way out, choosing to project Sufi Islam as a potential bulwark against terrorism. This option seems inspired by a RAND Corporation report on partnering with alternative institutions in the Muslim world, in which Sufi Islam was identified Since the floods, it has become doubly difficult to reduce the influence of militant organizations as one such element.21

The historical nature and significance of Sufi Islam is that it is more tolerant and pluralistic than puritanical interpretations of Islam. Traditionally, people from all religions, sects, ethnicities, castes, etc. visit Sufi shrines in South Asia. There is ample excitement in Washington, many European states, and Pakistan itself regarding Sufi Islam as a possible replacement for the seemingly violent orthodox version of Islam. During a visit to Washington in March-April 2010, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani even recommended that the United States support Sufi Islam in Pakistan, as it is the most popular version of Islam in the country.

The issue of an alternative narrative, however, is far more complex than what could be calculated numerically. Terrorists do not represent the bulk of the population, mainly since militants operating in mainland Pakistan have opted to co-exist with other social forces without challenging local traditions, unlike the militants operating in tribal areas such as Fazlullah. Militant organizations are in no hurry to recruit members rapidly, as noted in books by jihadist leaders such as JeM’s Masood Azhar.

The primary problem remains the underlying extremism or latent radical attitudes which seem to be growing unabated. The growth of latent radicalism is due to a general lack of knowledge in Pakistan’s religious discourse, especially concerning alternative interpretations of the Qur’an and presentations of Shari’a that do not breed hatred of the ‘‘other.’’

Pakistan is certainly not the only country facing this problem, as such a narrative is not taking root in most of the Muslim world. But given that Pakistan is immensely affected by terrorism, it has a greater need for an alternative religious narrative, and it cannot act complacently since the popularity of Sufism is an issue that lacks clarity. The majority of Deobandis, who follow a more orthodox interpretation of Islam, also subscribe to local Sufi traditions. Moreover, Sufi institutions do not necessarily counter orthodox ideology and are not equipped with the modern methods of communication used by extremist elements.

To get out of the trap of puritanical religious interpretations, especially the takfiri ideology, the Pakistani government must reach out to moderate religious scholars in Pakistan, as well as the rest of the Muslim world, to initiate a debate within the society. Such scholars should focus on introducing and establishing the principle of Islamic secularism based on the separation of religion from state.

Also, those members of Pakistani society who seek inspiration or reasoning from religion should be offered alternative interpretations of Islam that do not support takfir or discourage tolerance. This used to be the mainstream narrative in Islam, but it was pushed aside in the post-colonial Muslim world. Pakistan needs to change its socioeconomic balance and create a new religious narrative.

Like other states, Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy is an end product of its peculiar strategic priorities. Although the country’s military and civilian authorities are conscious of the pressure the international community is putting on Pakistan to fight terrorism, top officials still are not yet convinced of the seriousness of the Obama administration to combat area militants.

President Obama’s announcement of a withdrawal beginning in July 2011 is interpreted as Washington losing its will and its intent to keep fighting. There are many in the strategic community in Pakistan who believe that the fight against terrorism will eventually be outsourced to the Pakistani military. Under such circumstances, Pakistan would have to continue investing in the Taliban, especially to counter India’s growing social and political influence in Kabul. The link with the Taliban and other local militant groups, as has been argued here, is in part the result of Pakistan’s traditional insecurity concerning India. Although militancy hurts Pakistan, there is an unwillingness to abandon it as a policy tool. Using militants as part of a proxy war is a concept well integrated into Pakistan’s military strategy.22

Not only is there an unwillingness to eliminate militancy entirely, the state also has not developed an alternative social narrative that would help change the mindset producing or supporting terrorism. The subsequent sociopolitical anarchy in Pakistan adds to the problem, combining collectively to mean that the United States cannot expect Islamabad to fight the war on Washington’s terms, whatever they may be in the coming months and years.

Notes
1. Correspondent for the British daily The Independent, discussion with author, Islamabad, August 2, 2010.
2. Kamran Yousaf, ‘‘Pakistan, U.S. at odds over definition,’’ The Express Tribune, October 30, 2010, http://tribune.com.pk/story/69816/pakistan-us-at-odds-over-definition/.
3. Mohammad Aamir Rana, discussion with author, Islamabad, July 30, 2010.
4. Yahya Mujahid and Syed Saleem Shehzad, discussion with author, Islamabad, October 10, 2010.
5. ‘‘India Supporting Militancy in Balochistan: Musharraf,’’ The Express Tribune, October
10, 2010, http://tribune.com.pk/story/60862/india-supporting-militancy-in-balochistanmusharraf/.
6. Yahya Mujahid, interview with author, Islamabad, October 10, 2010.
7. Karachi-based journalist, confidential discussion with author, October 7, 2010.
8. Bob Woodword, Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), p. 116.
9. Major General Athar Abbas, discussion with author, Rawalpindi, November 2009.
10. This was part of Pasha’s statement to a select group of media soon after the Mumbai attacks. Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy11. Susanne Koelbl, ‘‘Pakistan’s New Intelligence Chief: ‘Terror Is Our Enemy, Not India’,’’ Der Spiegel, January 6, 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,599724,00.html.
12. Dexter Filkins, ‘‘Pakistanis Tell of Motive in Taliban Leader’s Arrest,’’ The New York Times, August 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/world/asia/23taliban.html.
13. U.S. diplomats from the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, discussions with author, October 12, 2010.
14. Safiya Aftab, ‘‘Poverty and Underdevelopment,’’ The Friday Times, April 9, 2010, http://waseb.wordpress.com/2010/04/19/poverty-and-underdevelopment-by-safiya-aftab/.
15. Ayesha Siddiqa, ‘‘Terror’s Training Ground,’’ Newsline, September 9, 2009, http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2009/09/terror’s-training-ground/.
16. Vali Nasr, Forces of Fortune: The Rise of the New Muslim Middle Class and What It Will Mean for Our World (Free Press, 2009).
17. See Ayesha Siddiqa, ‘‘The Conservatively Hip,’’ Newsline, August 31, 2010, http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2010/08/the-conservatively-hip/.
18. Shahzada Irfan Ahmed and Ayesha Siddiqa, ‘‘Religious Mission or Political Ambition?,’’ Newsline, September 30, 2010, http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2010/09/religious-mission-or-political-ambition/.
19. Javed Ahmed Ghamdi, discussion with author, Islamabad, October 8, 2010.
20. Jamal Hoti, ‘‘Moderate scholar Dr. Farooq killed in Mardan,’’ Dawn, October 3, 2010, http://news.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/44-swat-universitys-vice-chancellor-dr-farooq-assasinated-fa-03.
21. Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Benard, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Peter Sickle, ‘‘Building Moderate Muslim Networks,’’ RAND Corporation Monograph Series (Santa Monica, CA:RAND Corporation, 2007), pp. 102—103, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG574.pdf.
22. Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, ‘‘The Sorcerer’s Apprentice: Islamist Militancy in South Asia,’’ The Washington Quarterly 33, no. 1 (January 2010), pp. 47—59, http://www.twq.com/10january/docs/10jan_GangulyKapur.pdf.

December 15, 2010

Pakistan Army owns up the ISI man on a suicide attack mission in India

by admin

Name: Zulfiqar Ahmed, ‘Army No.’ 1726016, Rank: Naik, ‘Arm/Service’: ‘Engrs’, ‘Formation/Unit’ ‘HQ 30 Corps/Dte Gen ISI’, Operation: Suicide Attack

Related article:

Online factories of suicide bombers: An ISI production

LUBP has been boldly stating for the last many years that Pakistan Army’s continued policy of jihadi and sectarian suicide attacks, and its collaboration with extremist Deobandis of Sipah-e-Sahaba and Taliban and extremist Wahhabis of Lashkar-e-Taiba / Jamatud-Dawa is fatal for peace and security of Pakistan and the entire region.

Now it has been once again proven without doubt that jihadi and sectarian suicide attacks are an integral element of the Pakistan Army’s military strategy, and that this strategy is executed through the notorious anti-democracy (but pro-extremist-Deobandi and pro-extremist-Wahhabi) spy agency, the ISI.

Actual screenshot

Screen-shot from the Pakistan Army's website

The original site has been removed by the Pakistan Army, hence not opening up any more, but Google retains a cache of the original page.

Original link: Now inaccessible: http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/modules/shuhadascorner/embed_shuhada_detail.aspx?id=5838

Google cache

The cache page is likely to be removed once spider finds it no longer exists in its next crawl.

Screenshot of the page and the photo:

http://img18.imageshack.us/img18/3733/zulfiqarahmedpakistanar.jpg

http://img690.imageshack.us/img690/3733/zulfiqarahmedpakistanar.jpg

Video reports

ISI man on a suicide mission in India listed as ‘Martyr’ on Pak Army website

The Shuhda (Martyrs) Corner on the Pakistan Army Website

ISI man who died in Delhi a martyr for Pak
It took over a decade for the Pakistani army to accept that its 500 soldiers and officers were involved in infiltrations along the Line of Control and were killed during during the 1999 Kargil war with India. Their names were recently listed as “martyrs” in ‘Shuhada’s (martyrs) corner’ of the Pakistan army’s website. And yesterday, there was another addition to the list: Naik Zulfiqar Ahmed — an ISI operative who was on a “suicide attack mission” to India.

Pakistani army’s website, http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk, claims that the ISI operative died at New Delhi’s Ganga Ram Hospital on November 16, 2007. Notwithstanding the fact that he was on a suicide attack operation, Naik Zulfiqar Ahmed’s name has been listed in the “martyr’s corner”.

The listing stated that Ahmed was on a “suicide attack” operation at the time of his death. The cause of death was given as “neptrrotic syndrome/ARI”. Nephrotic syndrome is a kidney disorder while ARI refers to acute respiratory infection.

Ahmed’s army serial no was 1726016 and he belonged to the engineering wing. His formation or unit was HQs 30 Corps/Dte Gen ISI, according to the listing, which has a picture of Ahmed.

As expected, the move invited sharp reactions from New Delhi. The (Indian) Army said the “intentions and ways” of Pakistani army had “become clear” with the neighbouring nation owning up a suicide bomber.

Indian Army’s Reaction

Chief of Indian Army Staff General VK Singh said: “I have nothing to say on what they (Pakistani Army) have put up on its website. But if it has (owned up), then it clearly show what their intentions and ways are and what their next move will be.” “All I can say is we have to be more alert and only then we can protect our people and troops,” Gen Singh said while speaking to reporters here on the sidelines of an Army function. (Source: The Tribune India)

Pakistan Army’s Reaction:

A red-faced Pakistan Army has hurriedly removed from its website the records of an alleged suicide bomber of ISI who died in New Delhi in November 2007 of renal failure. (Source: Deccan Herald)

Report in Pakistan’s daily Jang

While there is a complete blackout of this news item in (the ISI dominated) Pakistani media, only an invisible single column news was published in daily Jang:

پاک فوج کی ویب سائٹ پر خودکش بمبار کی تصویر ہے ، بھارتی آرمی چیف

لاہور( خالد محمود خالد ) بھارتی آرمی چیف جنرل وی کے سنگھ نے خودکش بمبار بھارت بھیجنے کے اعتراف پر پاکستانی فوج پر شدید تنقید کی ہے ، نئی دہلی میں وزارت دفاع کے زیر اہتمام ایک تقریب میں انہوں نے کہا کہ پاکستان آرمی نے اپنی ویب سائٹ پر ” شہداء کارنر“ میں نائیک ذوالفقار احمد کی تصویر لگا کر اس بات کا اعتراف کر لیا ہے کہ پاکستان بھارت میں آئی ایس آئی کے ایجنٹ کے طور پر اپنے فوجی خودکش حملوں کیلئے بھجوا رہا ہے ۔واضح رہے کہ پاکستان آرمی کی ویب سائٹ پر شہداء کارنر میں نائیک ذوالفقار احمد کے پروفائل میں کہا گیا ہے کہ ہیڈ کوارٹر 30کور / ڈائریکٹوریٹ جنرل آئی ایس آئی یونٹ کی انجینئرز آرم سے تعلق رکھنے والے ذوالفقار احمد کی شہادت 16نومبر 2007 کو نئی دہلی کے گنگا رام اسپتال میں ہوئی اور اس کا تعلق خودکش بمبار آپریشن سے تھا۔ یہ بات اہم ہے کہ پاکستانی فوج کی ویب سائٹ بھارتی آرمی چیف کی تنقید کے بعد ساڑھے تین بجے دیکھ بھال کیلئے بند کر دی گئی۔

http://www.jang.net/urdu/details.asp?nid=490846

December 12, 2010

A question for Pakistanis in favour of "reconciliation" with the Afghan Taliban

by admin


In recent months, as Western despair over the Afghanistan war has increased, there has been a chorus of voices suggesting reconciliation of the Taliban leadership is the only path to end the Afghan war. It is quite natural that those in the West who do not wish to outright say that the war effort in Afghanistan has been a failure, and do not wish to suggest to the governments of NATO countries that failure should be acknowledged and that the troops should retreat in defeat, should wish to present reconciliation as a means to achieve some sort of positive settlement. No one likes to concede military defeat, and those advocating for military drawdown and reconciliation with the Taliban know that it would be a non-starter to try to sell their plan as acknowledgement of defeat and how best to manage it.

That is fine. There are legitimate reasons for those in the West to realize that their efforts in Afghanistan have been unsuccessful. But what is more interesting to me is that in today’s globalized world, a number of Pakistanis have joined in this chorus of anti-war voices. You have former generals like Mirza Aslam Beg claiming that the war is over, that the Afghan resistance has won. You have leftists who may or may not celebrate the victory of the Afghan resistance (since they certainly don’t share a common worldview with it) but who refuse to see beyond the need to expel the imperialist US from Afghanistan and what they perceive as its encroachment on Pakistan and finally you have Pakistani nationalists of the liberal persuasion who see the US occupation of Afghanistan as the root cause of the wave of terror that’s engulfed Pakistan and who believe that an end to the US occupation will result in an end to Pakistan’s problems.

The first group, i.e. the victorious generals who hope to ride to Central Asia, Kashmir and beyond on the backs of their “proxy warriors” even while their military families and subordinates in the army are under attack by the ideological cousins of these proxy warriors can be dismissed as simply irrational. Through a combination of their own special brand of Islamism mixed with nationalism and what they perceive to be “pragmatism” they are headed down a suicidal path and they are trying their best to take the rest of the country along with them. The second two groups, however, are worthy of debating with. They genuinely believe that the root cause of the Islamist insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan lies with the actions of the Imperialist West. Indeed it would be difficult to argue that without the money and resources from the first Afghan Jihad in the 80s, the jihadist machine in Pakistan and Afghanistan could have come up on its own. However, it is a real leap of logic to assert that the West today is the same West of the 80s which funded and raised the Islamists. The US today is clearly in direct conflict with its former proteges in the GHQ who are attempting to shield their strategic assets from drone strikes in North Waziristan. Political realities change and the leftists who believe that the US created the original jihadist monster and so its withdrawal from Afghanistan will result in its end are either not thinking the situation through or are motivated simply by opposition to the US, no matter which way the US is oriented. When the US leaves Afghanistan, who will pressure the Pakistani GHQ to stop supporting its strategic assets that launch attacks into Afghanistan? Who will pressure Pakistan’s ISI to stop sponsoring terrorist attacks in Kabul? Who will pressure Pakistan to stop attempting to overturn the Karzai government and from repeating its war of attrition against the Najibullah regime in the early 90s?

The question is, for Pakistanis who claim to be oppposed to the military’s hegemony over political and foreign policy, how do they justify their tactical alliance with the triumphant generals of the Aslam Beg persuasion who are cheering on the retreat of the US from Afghanistan? Do they genuinely believe that reconciliation with the Quetta Shura can be successful? Do they genuinely believe that by giving the Afghan Taliban a share in the political process in Afghanistan that the political process can be preserved in any recognizable form of representative government? What do Pakistanis who urge the Afghan government to reconcile with the Quetta Taliban really want? Would they accept a similiar exhortation from others to involve the TTP in the political process in Pakistan? Does anyone genuinely believe that by giving the TTP or Lashkar-e-Jhangvi a stake in the political process in Islamabad that the insurgency in Pakistan can be brought to an end? In the words of Amrullah Saleh, the former director of the NDS and one of the most disliked Afghans by most nationalist Pakistanis because of his negative views on the Pakistani sponsorship of terror in Afghanistan: “they [the Taliban] will die in democracy, they will die in a country where law is ruling, not guns, not IEDs, not the spread of fear and intimidation.”” How many Pakistanis who readily advocate “reconciliation” in Afghanistan would agree to these words by Saleh if they were applied to Maulana Fazlullah, or Maulvi Faqir Muhammad, or Maulana Masood Azhar? How many Pakistanis who would be horrified at giving any of the above-mentioned mass-murderers a stake in Pakistani politics are eager and willing to suggest that Afghanistan – because it is an uncivilized nation unlike Pakistan – should give its own mass-murderers a stake in their fragile political setup even while they are involved in a war against the Afghan state.

I do not wish to condemn Pakistanis who support an early end to the Afghan war. I personally do not believe that the Afghan war effort is a successful one from a US perspective or is a conflict that can be won and if I were from the US I would probably support an early end to the conflict as well. However, I do not believe that the facts on the ground support the cosy conclusion that a swift end to the Afghan conflict will result in a reduction of Pakistan’s domestic problems with extremism. If anything, if one is to compare the present situation to the period preceding the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the period following a US withdrawal will result in a massive increase in extremism, a belief by the Taliban and their supporters that they have achieved victory over not one, but two superpowers and with that, a sense of triumph and renewed zeal for establishing their Islamic state across Pakistan and Afghanistan.

In short, Pakistan has its own political problems that cannot be simply reduced to a struggle against Western imperialism. It would be unwise to deny agency to Pakistan’s own actors who stand to benefit from an early US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Therefore I just wish for these Pakistani advocates of “reconciliation” to take a look at their own motivations. Oftentimes when a political position is too comfortable – i.e. when it makes one feel self-satisfied on all accounts – one should be suspicious of it. In this case, there is a self-satisfying feeling of being a good global leftist and a nationalist Pakistani at the same time. There is something suspicious about how well these two sentiments merge and Pakistanis who genuinely fear the rise of Islamists in our part of the world should think twice about throwing their lot in with the global anti-war movement and all its rhetoric.

December 5, 2010

Where do the missing persons go? Mystery solved

by admin

Hassan Shakeel Turabi was an avid follower of Ansar Abbasi, Hamid Mir and Irfan Siddiqi's views published in daily Jang / Geo TV

Suggestion: Read this post in the reverse chronological order of events, reading the last news item first.

What is hard to ignore in the whole episode is:

1. The dubious role of Pakistan’s ISI (the double game agency);

2. The unprofessional role of the PFUJ and other professional journalists / organisations who withheld certain important aspects of this disappearance (e.g., the lad’s links with the jihadi and sectarian mafia);

3. The credibility of the missing persons theory, while some of them might have been forcibly (and illegally) kidnapped or eliminated by the ISI, a significant number of them get voluntarily recruited in the ISI cum Taliban’s war on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

4. Now the test is: Will the PFUJ offer an apology or explanation? Will the Supreme Court of Pakistan examine this case further and lead it to its logical conclusion?

اسلام آباد کے صحافی شکیل ترابی کے گمشدہ بیٹے کاپتالگالیاگیا

5 Dec 2010, Updated at 1310 PST

اسلام آباد …اسلام آباد کے صحافی شکیل ترابی کے گمشدہ بیٹے کاپتالگالیاگیا حسن شرجیل ترابی سے والدہ اور ماموں کی پاک افغان سرحد کے قریب لوارا کے مقام پر ملاقات کرائی گئی۔اسلام آباد میں ڈی آئی جی آپریشنز بنیامین نے جیو نیوزکو بتایا کہ پولیس نے اپنے ذرائع سے رابطہ کر کے اس ملاقات کا اہتمام کیا ، حسن شرجیل ترابی خیریت سے ہیں اوران کی والدہ نے بیٹے سے ملاقات کرانے پر انھیں شکریہ کا ٹیلی فون بھی کیا ہے۔ڈی آئی جی آپریشنز کے مطابق حسن شرجیل افغانستان میں امریکی فوج کے خلاف جنگ میں حصہ لے رہاہے۔ ملاقات کے دوارن حسن شرجیل کی والدہ انھیں گھر واپسی کے لیے قائل کرنے میں ناکام رہیں۔حسن شرجیل یکم جنوری2010 سے لاپتاتھے اور خیال ظاہر کیا جارہا تھاکہ وہ خفیہ ایجنسیوں کی تحویل میں ہیں۔ان کی گمشدگی پر سپریم کورٹ نے از خود نوٹس بھی لیاتھا۔

http://search.jang.com.pk/update_details.asp?nid=104879

…..

‘Fighting occupation forces’ – Turabi’s son meets his mother: police

5 December 2010

The police are said to have arranged a meeting between the ‘missing’ son of a journalist, Shakeel Turrabi, and his mother in Lowara town near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. According to a police press statement, a police source had arranged the meeting.

Earlier, the Supreme Court had directed the police to arrange a meeting of Turabi’s son, Hassan Sherjil Turabi, with his parents.

The police claimed that his mother, however, failed to persuade Sherjil Turabi to return home because “he wanted to go to Afghanistan to fight the occupation forces”.

Without giving further details of the meeting, the police claimed that the meeting had been arranged via a “police source among the mujahideen”.

Hassan Turabi was reported missing since January 1 this year and his father had accused that Sherjil was abducted by intelligence agencies. He had also lodged a complaint of his son’s alleged abduction.

Earlier, Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry had taken suo motu action in this matter and directed Inspector-General of Police Kaleem Imam and DIG (Operations) Bani Amin to recover the boy.

In the last hearing, the police had informed the Supreme Court that Sharjil’s presence had been confirmed in Lowara, a town few kilometres from Miramshah in Waziristan, where he had been living with militants “and fighting occupation forces in Afghanistan”.

It was contended that he had gone to fight Jihad of his own free will. The court dismissed the case and directed the police to arrange a meeting between Sharjeel and his parents.

Published in The Express Tribune, December 5th, 2010. Source

………..

SC to hear suo moto action against non- recovery of Turabi’s son today

10 Nov 2010

ISLAMABAD, (SANA): Supreme Court of Pakistan will hear suo moto action against non-recovery of abducted Hassan Sharjeel, son of senior journalist Shakeel Ahmed Turabi here today (Wednesday).

Three-member bench of the SC headed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry and comprising Justice Tariq Pervaiz and Justice Ghulam Rabbani will hear suo moto notice taken by Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.

Supreme Court has summoned I.G Islamabad Police Syed Kaleem Imam, D.I.G Police, Binyamin for hearing the matter.

http://www.sananews.net/english/2010/11/10/sc-to-hear-suo-moto-action-against-non-recovery-of-turabi%E2%80%99s-son-today/

……….

14 Sep 2010

PFUJ seeks release of journalists son
By PPI 14 September 2010 Tuesday

Islamabad: The Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists has expressed concern over failure of the auditories to locate Hasan Sharjeel, 18, son of Shakil Turabi, the Editor-In-Chief of the Islamabad-based news agency. Mr. Shakil Turabi, believes that “military intelligence agencies were involved in the kidnapping of his son.

He said that he received “a letter in June purporting to have come from the kidnappers, who indicated they wanted a ransom. But details given in the letter for establishing contact turned out to be uncredible.” It is because of my articles. In the past, I was kidnapped and then attacked. Now they have abducted his son. He said sources in the army have told him that his son is being held by a Pakistani intelligence agency. “The grounds for holding his son were his alleged links with an armed group implicated in an attack on a mosque in which senior military officers and their family members were killed”, Mr. Shakil Truabi added. He further said ohe is 99 per cent sure that Hasan is innocent, but if he really involved in illegal activity, let him be tried and hanged. Turabi has been pressing the Islamabad police to seek his sonIs release, if he is innocent, or to bring him to trial if he is alleged to have done something against the law. The PFUJ lamented the concerned agencies failure to trace Hssan Sarjeel.

The PFUJ pointed out that it is the constitutional obligation of the state to protect the life and property of each and every citizen, yet the entire government machiney seems unmoved which is a serious offence. It further said that it is the responsibility of the State Agencies to ensure security of the citizens rather to abduct and torture them. Such allegations have become order of the day in Pakistan owing to unchecked powers grabbed by military agencies. The media persons are fighting for building the image of Pakistan and it would be very unfortunate if media involved in checking activities of state security agencies, the PFUJ observed. The PFUJ regretted that after months of pleading with the military authorities to release his son, Turabi managed to get the case referred to the Supreme Court which was pleaded to order the Federal Interior Ministry to intercede. The PFUJ said irrespective of the identity of the kidnappers and their motives, the facts of this tragic case required to be established without further delay. The accusations that Turabi i against certain sectors of the army are so serious that the President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardai being Comarander-in-Chief of Armed forces needs to take serious notice of this incident,” The PFUJ stressed.

http://www.onepakistan.com/news/national/62713-PFUJ-seeks-release-journalists-son.html

………….

Who is holding Shakil Turabi’s son?
14 September 2010

New York: Reporters Without Borders supports a request by Shakil Turabi, the editor-in-chief of the Islamabad-based South Asian News Agency (SANA), for the authorities to carry a rapid and thorough investigation into his 18-year-old son’s disappearance since 5 January 2010.

Turabi believes that military intelligence agencies were involved in abducting his son, Hasan Sharjeel. He received a letter in June purporting to come from the kidnappers, who indicated they wanted a ransom. But the details given in the letter for establishing contact turned out not to be credible.

“Regardless of the identity of the abductors and their motives, the facts of this tragic case need to be established without delay,” Reporters Without Borders said. “The accusations that Turabi has made against certain sectors of the army are so serious that the army chief of staff, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, needs to intervene.”

After months of pleading with the military authorities to release his son, Turabi managed to get the case referred to the Pakistani supreme court, which last week ordered the interior ministry to intercede.

Turabi told Reporters Without Borders: “It is because of my articles. In the past, I was kidnapped and then attacked. Now it is my son’s turn to be attacked. And so they have had him abducted.” He said sources within the army have told him that his son is being held by a Pakistani intelligence agency.

Turabi said the grounds for holding his son were his alleged links with an armed group implicated in an attack on a mosque in which senior military officers and their family members were killed. In a TV interview, Turabi said: “I am 99 per cent sure that Hasan is innocent, but if he really was involved in illegal activity, let him be tried and hanged.”

Turabi has been pressing the Islamabad police to seek his son’s release, if he is innocent, or to have him brought to trial if he is alleged to have done something illegal.

Reporters Without Borders reported the various physical attacks on Turabi in 2007 in press releases.

http://www.sananews.net/english/2010/09/14/who-is-holding-shakil-turabis-son/

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Shakil Turabi’s son in Gul Raziq custody: Sakhi Afghani discloses in letter
30 June 2010

ISLAMABAD, (SANA): After the hearing of many weeks of Hassan Sharjeel’s suo moto notice by Chief Justice of Pakistan Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry the case took a new turn on Wednesday when father of Hassan Sharjeel (Editor-in-Chief of South Asian News Agency Shakeel Ahmad Turabi) received a letter from a person named Sakhi Afghani.

In the letter Sakhi Afghani disclosed that Hassan Sharjeel is in good health and is in the custody of a person named Gul Raziq.

Sakhi Afghani noted that he was a driver of Gul Raziq and he had kidnapped Hassan Sharjeel from Islamabad on 5th January in a vehicle No RIT-3156.

Sakhi also claimed that he is resident of Afghan province Khost and presently is living in Miranshah headquarters of North Waziristan Agency.

He also claimed that he kidnapped children for ransom purposes and presently there are many children in their custody hailing from Punjab, Sindh and other areas and suggested that we (parents of Hassan Sharjeel) should contact Gul Raziq for Hassan’s recovery.

Two telephone numbers were given in the letter and on repeated contacts on one No -which is of district Bannu- given on the letter no response was received.

Contacting on the other No the receiving person was talking in Pushto inquiring him that could he understands English no answer was received but through Pushto translator the person said that his name is Gul Muhammad and he is resident of Lugar province of Afghanistan.

On contacting again the respondent said that he is resident of Kandahar province of Afghanistan and told that he did not know any person named Sakhi Afghani and Gul Raziq and somebody has given you wrong number.

It is also worth mentioning here that Hassan Sharjeel gone missing five months and 26 days ago from Islamabad when he went to college but did not return home till today.

Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry had taken suo moto notice of Hassan’s kidnapping and hearing of the case is fixed for 2nd July tomorrow (Friday) in which the police had been ordered to present Hassan in court at every cost.

http://www.sananews.net/english/2010/06/30/shakil-turbi%E2%80%99s-son-in-gul-raziq-custody-sakhi-afghani-discloses-in-letter-2/

………

Journalists protest before NPC for recovery of Shakil Turabi’s son.

7 January 2010

ISLAMABAD, January 07, 2010 (Frontier Star): Journalists from Rawalpindi Islamabad protested before National Press club here on Thursday for immediate recovery of Sharjeel Turabi, son of senior journalist Shakil Ahmed Turabi. Addressing to protestors President Press club Afzal Butt said that kidnap of Sharjeel Turabi is condemnable. On one side columnists and journalists are facing terrorism while on the other side different pressure groups of political parties are pressurizing media. He said any attempt to harm any journalist would be considered as attack over whole journalist community. It is responsibility of Secret departments to provide security to us not to tease us. Afzal Butt said that journalists are fighting for existence of the country and working for development of the country. He gave time frame of twenty-four hours and said that if nothing would be done in twenty-four hours then they would independently plan their strategy. On this occasion Secretary press club Asim Rana said then if Hasan Sharjeel was not recovered then protest demonstrations would be arranged throughout the country. He demanded from Interior Minister to constitute a special committee for immediate recovery of Hasan Sharjeel.

(THROUGH ASIA PULSE)

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Journalists+protest+before+NPC+for+recovery+of+Shakil+Turabi’s+son.-a0216238749

….

14 September 2007

Fourteen-year old son of journalist beaten for his father’s reporting

INCIDENT DETAILS

Hassan Sharjil, Shakil Ahmad Turabi assaulted (CPJ/IFEX) – The following is a CPJ press release:

Outrage as 14-year old son of Pakistani journalist beaten for his father’s reporting

New York, September 14, 2007 – The Committee to Protect Journalists is outraged by the assault on Hassan Sharjil, the 14-year-old son of prominent journalist Shakil Ahmad Turabi, editor-in-chief of the South Asian News Agency. Hassan was beaten by a man outside his school today in Islamabad as he was dropped off for classes at around 6:45 a.m. Another man remained at the wheel of a four-door white pickup truck parked nearby while the beating took place. The pair had shouted to the boy from the truck before the attack began. Pakistani journalists say this is one of the types of vehicles frequently used by plainclothes government security forces.

Hassan’s father told CPJ that the man beating his son told him, “We warned your father to stop writing lies, but he wouldn’t listen. This will teach him a lesson.” Hassan has been moved from the hospital to his family’s home for safety. He was badly beaten on the head and his back was heavily bruised, his father said.

His father, Turabi, had been assaulted on May 18, when he was pulled from his car and beaten in a commercial area of the capital at around 10:45 a.m. That attack came during political tension surrounding the ouster of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry by President Pervez Musharraf. The day before the May 18 attack, Turabi had written a piece that contradicted government claims that local police, not government intelligence agents, had roughed up Chaudhry when the judge was detained in March.

“For thugs to attack a 14-year-old schoolboy because they do not like what his journalist father writes is an indicator of how little respect for the basic level of law and order remains in the nation’s capital,” said Joel Simon, CPJ’s executive director. “We call upon the authorities to open a full investigation or prosecution and bring those responsible to justice. If not, this incident will be just another gash in the fabric of Pakistan’s disintegrating civil society.”

Turabi said that though he had filed a complaint with the police about today’s attack on his son, he expects the police will not take action or investigate. They did not take action on his case in May, either.

Attacks on journalists by plainclothes police are common in Pakistan and are becoming worse as the political atmosphere heats up about upcoming presidential elections. On September 11, CPJ wrote an open letter to President Musharraf, expressing concern about reports of brutal attacks on journalists by security personnel during that morning’s arrival of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Islamabad.

http://www.ifex.org/pakistan/2007/09/14/fourteen_year_old_son_of_journalist/

December 1, 2010

Our dereliction in Kurram

by admin

Kurram has had to run the gauntlet of the first TTP chief, Baitullah Mehsud, who sent his Waziristan lashkar there under the blood-thirsty Qari Hussain in 2007.

According to a report published in a newspaper on November 30, the government has allowed a very dubious meeting between the elders of the Kurram Agency, members of the outlawed Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) and “foreign” agents of the Haqqani Group from North Waziristan. The meeting was held “in a guesthouse” in Islamabad and the objective was “restoration of peace in Parachinar (Kurram headquarters) which has remained cut off from the rest of country for three years.”

Who were the interlocutors? MNA Sajid Hussain Turi representing the Shia of Kurram and some elders, while the opposite side was represented by Qari Taj, the commander of the Haqqani Group in Kurram Agency, and Karim Mushtaq, TTP commander for Kurram and Orakzai agencies. Another MNA, Munir Khan Orakzai, also attended the meeting. The talks were fruitless because the Shia Turi side was not willing to give the right of way to the TTP and Haqqani group militants through their territory. In retaliation, the other side refused to lift the roadblock on Thall-Parachinar Road that cuts Kurram off from the rest of the country.

The Turis are in a bind. They can’t leave or enter their agency and have to use Afghanistan territory where they are at risk of being killed by pro-al Qaeda terrorists. Al Qaeda is not particularly fond of the Turis because they are Shia and because they did not allow al Qaeda leadership to stay on their soil after its escape from Tora Bora in 2001. Well-off Turis spend Rs8,000 on a plane ride from Peshawar to get home. The Agency is no longer under any semblance of federal government control for the last three years. And the Haqqani Group from Afghanistan, which is being allowed to hold talks with the Turis in Islamabad, has no business being in Pakistan.

Pakistan is projecting its power into Afghanistan on the basis of warriors who don’t belong to Pakistan and is giving them a status inside Pakistan that violates the sovereignty of the state. The TTP is dominant under the banner of anti-Shia feeling spread in the region by the Sipah-e-Sahaba, a banned terrorist organisation of Punjab which inspires the tribes that live around Kurram. Kurram lies next to the three Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Nangarhar. It has half a million inhabitants out of which around two-fifths are Shia — besides, the capital Parachinar has a majority Shia population. The agency lies next to Waziristan, Orakzai and Khyber agencies where warlords harbour severely sectarian feelings. Down the road from Kurram to Peshawar, cities like Kohat and Hangu have Shia communities cowering before the power of the Taliban for the last decade.

Kurram has had to run the gauntlet of the first TTP chief, Baitullah Mehsud, who sent his Waziristan lashkar there under the blood-thirsty Qari Hussain in 2007. Around 400 Mehsud and Wazir militants fought against the Shia in Kurram, burning down villages and killing dozens of them. Two months later, another warlord, Hakimullah Mehsud, sent hundreds of fighters to outnumber the Shia offering resistance to him. After becoming head of the TTP, Hakimullah appointed Mullah Noor Jamal from Orakzai, known as Mullah Toofan, to lead the Taliban. Mullah Toofan, a brutal commander, indulged in carnage and blocked the above-mentioned road, cutting Kurram from the rest of Pakistan. Infamous warlord Mangal Bagh of Khyber Agency, successfully challenging the Pakistan army, has also dipped his hands in the blood of the people of Kurram.

Pakistan’s military strategy focuses on a quest to control territories not part of its map, at the expense of territory it does have. The bulk of the Pakistan Army faces India on the eastern border. Because of Pakistan’s ambivalence towards the TTP and the Haqqani Group, it has had to suffer a gradual diminution of its writ in small cities like Kohat, Hangu and Bannu, while virtually losing control over the provincial capital, Peshawar. On the eve of America’s exit from Afghanistan, the focus is on how to prevent India from retaining its foothold there. It is difficult to imagine how territories lost inside Pakistan in the pursuit of this strategy will be regained.

Editorial
http://tribune.com.pk/story/84089/our-dereliction-in-kurram/
Published in The Express Tribune, December 1st, 2010.